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INTRODUCTION

Service of process in foreign countries has become commonplace; transnational litigation naturally ensues from a large amount of international
trade and travel.' Up until the early 1960's, however, service of process
between United States and foreign litigants was a judicial nightmare.' Then
in the short span of three years, three rather revolutionary procedures were
established which would greatly facilitate such actions.' The last of these
expediting procedures, the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (the
Convention),4 is arguably the most important and will be the primary focus
of this Comment'
Although early judicial interpretations of the Convention somewhat belied its importance, 6 United States courts have made an "about-face" by
1. See Bishop, InternationalLitigation in Texas: Service of Process and Jurisdiction, 35 Sw.
L.J. 1013 (1982); Smit, InternationalAspects ofFederalCivil Procedure,61 COLUM. L. REV. 1031
(1961).
2. See infra notes 16-25, 32-36 and accompanying text discussing problems encountered by
foreign and American parties.
3. The first of these was the addition of Federal Rule 4(i) in 1963. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i). This
significantly eased the burden on United States plaintiffs serving process abroad. See infra notes
26-31 and accompanying text. The second was the enactment in 1964 of Public Law 88-619 (Pub.
L. 88-619) which had the complimentary effect of facilitating foreign plaintiffs' service on United
States defendants. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 3491 (1982); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1696, 1741, 1745, 1781-84
(1982). See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
4. Openedfor signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163
(entered into force for the United States Feb. 10, 1969) [hereinafter Convention].
The full text of the Convention is set out in Appendix A. The Convention is also conveniently
reprinted in the following sources: 28 U.S.C.A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, app. at 104 (West Supp. 1987);
R. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS, app. at A-4 (1983); HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRACTICAL HANDBOOK ON THE OPERATION OF THE HAGUE
CONVENTION OF 15 NOVEMBER 1965 ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS 3 (1983) [hereinafter PRACTICAL
HANDBOOK]; VIII MARTINDALE-HUBBEL LAW DIRECTORY, Part VII, at 1 (1987).
5. The Convention facilitates service of process for both United States and foreign litigants.
As of March, 1988, thirty nations and various island-states were signatory parties to the Convention: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Figi, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Kurubati, Luxemburg, Malawi, Netherlands, Nevis, Norway, Portugal, Seychelles, Spain, St.
Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. Telephone
interview with David Epstein, Attorney with the Office of Foreign Litigation, Civil Division of the
United States Department of Justice (March 25, 1988).
Significantly, these parties to the Convention account for over 39% of the total imports and
36% of the total exports coming into and out of the United States. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1986, at 810 (106th ed. 1986).
6. See International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 179-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 941 (1979); Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 431 F. Supp. 1226, 1229 (N.D. Ill.
1977), affid, 565 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978); Shoei Kako Co. v.
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uniformly recognizing the Convention as the supreme law of the land.7 In
spite of all its recent judicial fanfare, this Convention, which preempts conflicting state and federal service of process statutes,8 still labors under virtual anonymity. 9 Perhaps because defective service is usually quashed and
the plaintiff is given another opportunity to correctly serve the defendant,
the Convention has been accorded minimal significance."0 But even though
litigants may have a choice as to when they need to understand the provisions of the Convention, proper service of process depends on that happening sooner or later.
Reading and applying the provisions of the Convention may at first
blush seem easy, I but the courts themselves have interpreted the articles of
the Convention inconsistently. Furthermore, a close analysis uncovers a
myriad of legal problems, the judicial resolution of which will only begin to
take place in forthcoming years.
In order to correctly interpret the Convention, its purpose and "legislative history" must first be explored. This will be addressed in part II of this
Comment by tracing the events which led to the Convention's establish-

Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, _, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402, 412 (1973) (standing for proposition
that the Convention does not abrogate Federal Rule 4 and merely constitutes supplementary
methods of service). Recently, a Wisconsin court of appeals also fundamentally misinterpreted
the terms of the Convention by stating that it "is not the exclusive vehicle for the service of
process." See Vause v. Vause, 140 Wis. 2d 157, 162 (Ct. App. 1987). See also Newport Components v. NEC Home Elecs., 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1542 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (confusing non-mandatory
application of Evidence Convention with Service Convention); infra note 92.
7. See, e-g., Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 838 (2d Cir. 1986); Vorhees v. Fischer &
Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 575-76 (4th Cir. 1983); Rissew v. Yamaha Motor Co., 129 A.D.2d 94, -,
515 N.Y.S.2d 352, 354 (App. Div. 1987). See also infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 77-103 and accompanying text for discussion of preemption problem.
9. The paucity of scholarly research on the Hague Convention can only be explained by the
relatively recent explosion of litigation concerning the Convention's interpretation. Perhaps now
that the United States Supreme Court has decided to rule on the Service Convention, greater
notice of its provisions will be taken. See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. This Comment aims to alert the legal community of the importance of this international treaty.
10. See, eg., Vorhees, 697 F.2d at 576; Cooper v. Makita, U.S.A., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 16, 18 (D.
Me. 1987); Victoria Sales Corp. v. Emery Air Freight Inc., No. 86 CIV. 1610 (JFK) (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 10, 1987); Hastings v. Graphic Sys. Div. of Int'l Corp., No. 86-1556-S (D. Kan. Mar. 30,
1987); Teknekron Mgmt., Inc. v. Quante Fernmeldetechnik GmbH, No. CV-N-86-481-ECR (D.
Nev. Feb. 20, 1987); Pochop v. Toyota Motor Co., 111 F.R.D. 464, 467 (S.D. Miss. 1986); Brown
v. Bellaplast Maschinenbau, 104 F.R.D. 585, 588 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Harris v. Browning-Ferris
Indus. Chem. Servs., 100 F.R.D. 775, 778 (M.D. La. 1984).
11. See Department of Justice Memorandum No. 386, Revision 3, 13 (July 1979) [hereinafter
Justice Dep't Memorandum) (suggesting that the Convention's text is "short and clear, and will
provide answers to the questions which are most frequently asked concerning the procedures to be
followed").

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:649

ment. 12 Part III will then construct a constitutional framework necessary
for the understanding of how the Convention interacts with state and federal law. 13 Part IV will set forth a comprehensive analysis of the Convention's provisions and discuss the legal issues which they raise. 14 Part V will
conclude this Comment by proposing state and federal rule changes which
15
will alert litigants to the potential applicability of the Hague Convention.
II.

HISTORICAL EVENTS LEADING TO THE CONVENTION

At the conclusion of World War II the United States emerged from its
global isolation with its international business and economic ties multiplied
considerably.16 The United States, however, neglected to modernize the
machinery for international judicial assistance which was needed to settle
the accompanying commercial litigation." 7 The problem was principally a
procedural one, characterized by an inability to find mutually acceptable
methods of service of process. The underlying roots of the problem were
twofold: (1) the fundamental differences between the civil and common law
systems, and (2) the United States federated judicial system with states
maintaining separate jurisdictional procedures."8 The various procedural
hurdles which confronted transnational litigants in their quest to serve process clearly underscored the need for a "unitary approach" to the
problem.19

12. See infra notes 16-51 and accompanying text. That one must understand the purpose of a
treaty to correctly interpret it, can most recently be seen by the United States Supreme Court's
analysis in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 55 U.S.L.W.
4842 (U.S. June 15, 1987). In Societe, the Court interpreted the provisions of the "sister" Evi-

dence Convention, see infra note 55, by analyzing its "negotiating history" as well as its "plain
language." Societe, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4844-46.
13. See infra notes 68-103 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 103-305 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 306-12 and accompanying text.
16. See COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RULES OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE - ESTABLISHMENT, S. REP. No. 2392, 85th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5201 [hereinafter COMMISSION ESTABLISHMENT].
17. See id. See also The Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, reprintedin 11
AM. J. COMP. L. 417 (1962); Jones, InternationalJudicialAssistance: ProceduralChaos and a
Programfor Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1953).
18. See COMMISSION ESTABLISHMENT, supra note 16, at 5202.
19. In 1955, Lloyd Wright, then President of the American Bar Association, accurately characterized the need for international judicial reform by noting:
With 49 separate procedural jurisdictions in the United States... a unitary approach is the
only solution. We can hardly expect [a foreign government] to look favorably on a program of separate negotiation with the representatives of the 48 states and with representative of the Federal Government. The problems must be solved through a single, unified set
of discussions, the results of which will be effective for all of the 49 jurisdictions.
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A.

ProblemsFacing Americans Serving Abroad

American litigants serving process abroad most frequently found themselves in a no-win situation. On the one hand, a service method had to be
chosen which met constitutional due process standards.2" On the other
hand, service had to be accomplished in a manner consistent with the local
laws of the foreign state.2" Methods which satisfied both requirements were
more likely to be found in draft proposals than in -state or federal laws.2 2
An American plaintiff trying to effect personal service on a foreign defendant soon realized that United States consular offices could not be
counted on to do the job at all.2 3 Furthermore, directly engaging counsel in
the foreign country where service was to be made was prohibitively expensive.24 The best available method was undoubtedly the use of letters rogatory.2 5 Overall, Americans found it difficult to perfect service in a manner
which not only was compatible with foreign law but also stood up to constitutional due process requirements at home.
The urgent need for reform was partially satisfied in 1963 with the addition of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i).2 6 Rule 4(i) essentially provides
S. REP. No. 2392, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5201, 5206 (emphasis added).
20. The constitutional due process requirements governing service of process were set out in
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). In judging whether substituted service on a defendant
was constitutional, the Court stated that "[i]ts adequacy so far as due process is concerned is
dependent on whether or not the form of... service provided for such cases and employed is
reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be
heard." Id. at 463. The Milliken standard was later refined in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See infra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
21. Americans tend to forget that foreign countries are quite sensitive to any infringement
upon their territorial sovereignty. Many nations flatly refuse to recognize American judgments
unless service has been made by a method required by their own law. See Jones, supra note 17, at
537; Smit, supra note 1, at 104041.
22. The need to reform international judicial procedures was recognized even before World
War II. In the late 1930's the Harvard Research Committee in International Law drafted a proposed multilateral agreement which would offer litigants a variety of service methods. The
Harvard Draft was farsighted indeed; its provisions were the basis for Federal Rule 4(i) and ultimately for the Hague Service Convention itself. See Jones, supranote 17, at 550-52; Note, Closing
the Chasm of InternationalJudicialAssistance: ExtraterritorialService of Documents, 12 How.
L.J. 238, 243-44 (1966).
23. Except in special instances as provided by federal statute, foreign service regulations prevent consular officers from executing service. The United States had furthermore entered into
only a few bilateral agreements which permitted such action. See Jones, supra note 17, at 536-37;
Note, supra note 22, at 240-41. See also infra note 185 and accompanying text.
24. Jones, supra note 17, at 536.
25. A letter rogatory is a "formal request, made by a court in which an action is pending, to a
foreign court to perform some judicial act." Stem, InternationalJudicialAssistance - Part1"
Service and Discovery Abroad, 14 PRAc. LAW. 8, 17, 22 (1968).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i). Rule 4(i)(1) provides in part:
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American litigants with supplementary methods of service in foreign countries. z7 It specifically allows a plaintiff to serve process in accordance with
the internal law of the receiving foreign nation. 8 Thus, Rule 4(i) allows an
American litigant to obviate the danger of a foreign court not recognizing a
judgment entered in a United States court for lack of valid service of process.29 Rule 4(i) also permits service of process by mail.3" In general, Rule
4(i) provides long overdue relief from the previous confines of permissible
federal statutory service methods.3 1
B.

Problems FacingForeignersServing Process in the United States

The procedural burdens imposed on foreign plaintiffs attempting to
serve process on American defendants were undoubtedly even more onerous. 32 First, foreign litigants often had to deal with the various state procedural mechanisms due to the American federated system.3 3 Second,
foreigners could scarcely find an official in the United States willing to effectuate service of process. In many foreign legal systems, service could only
be properly made by a government representative or some other official
channel. 34 The United States executive and judicial branches were of limited assistance to foreign litigants, however. The executive departments
When the federal or state law referred to in subdivision (e) of this rule authorizes service
upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district court is

held, and service is to be effected upon the party in a foreign country, it is also sufficient if
service of the summons and complaint is made: (A) in the manner prescribed by the law of
the foreign country for service in that country in an action in any of its courts of general
jurisdiction, or (B) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory,
when service in either case is reasonably calculated to give actual notice; or (C) upon an
individual, by delivery to him personally, and upon a corporation or partnership or associ-

ation, by delivery to an officer, a managing or general agent; or (D) by any form of mail,
requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the

party to be served; or (E) as directed by order of the court.
Id.
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(i).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(A).

29. See supra note 21. See also Bishop, supra note 1, at 1029.
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(D).
31. For a general discussion of the inadequacies of Rule 4 prior to the addition of subdivision
(i), see Smit, supra note 1, at 1031.
32. See Jones, supra note 17, at 538 ("It is probable that no other government [outside of the
American government] permit[ed] such widespread confusion and such profound disregard for
the concept of comity or international obligation in connection with judicial assistance between
nations.").
33. See S. REP. No. 2392, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprintedin 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5201, 5206.

34. See Downs, The Effect of the Hague Convention on Service Abroad of JudicialandExtrajudicial Documents in Civil or CommercialMatters, 2 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 125, 128-29 (1969).
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simply refused to transmit foreign letters rogatory.35 The American courts,
on the other hand, usually denied assistance due to a perceived absence of
power to process judicial requests.3 6 To be sure, foreign litigants found

themselves in a most precarious position.
Just as the 1963 addition of Rule 4(i) helped alleviate the burdens imposed on American plaintiffs serving process abroad, the enactment in 1964
of Public Law 88-6193' had the same facilitative effect on foreign plaintiffs
serving process in the United States. First, Public Law 88-619 expressly
authorized the Department of State to comply with foreign demands for

assistance in serving process on Americans. 38 Hence, the executive branch
of the United States government should willingly transmit foreign letters
rogatory. Second, Public Law 88-619 made it clear that United States
courts have the inherent authority to grant international judicial assistance,
which among other things means complying with letters rogatory issued

abroad.39
Public Law 88-619 clearly aimed at eliminating the procedural difficulties foreign litigants had historically faced. It was a unilateral initiative the
United States took with the hopes that foreign countries would similarly
adjust their procedures so as to facilitate American efforts to serve process
in their jurisdictions.'
C. Inadequacies of Public Law 88-619 and Rule 4(1)
Although the passage of Public Law 88-619 and Rule 4(i) marked a
watershed in American cooperation in international judicial assistance, fun35. See Jones, supra note 17, at 539. Many considered the executive branch's failure to
render assistance "a breach of obligation under international law." Id.
36. See Note, supra note 22, at 238-40. See also Jones, supra note 17, at 539-45.
American courts basically feared that rendering assistance with the service of process within
the United States would aid foreign courts in obtaining jurisdiction over American defendants.
See In re Letters Rogatory out of First Civil Court of City of Mexico, 261 Fed. 652 (S.D.N.Y.
1919). Civil courts, however, do not gain jurisdiction through the service of process as do their
common law counterparts. Jones, supra note 17, at 545.
37. Pub. L. 88-619, reprintedin 3 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1081 (1964). The amendments
of Pub. L. 88-619 to the United States Code which most concern service of process are §§ 1696
and 1781. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1696, 1781 (1982).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1982).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1696 (1982). For a general analysis of Pub. L. 88-619, see Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, Report No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 15, 1964), reprinted in 3 INT'L
LEGAL MAT'LS 1085-95 (1964) [hereinafter Report No. 1580]. See also Note, supra note 22, at
249.
40. See Report No. 1580, supra note 39, at 1086; Amram, The ProposedInternationalConvention on the Service of DocumentsAbroad,51 A.B.A. J. 650, 651 (1965) ("It is not unfair to say that
Public Law 88-619 is a one way street. It grants wide assistance to others, but demands nothing in
return.").
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damental problems persisted. One of the primary deficiencies of Federal
Rule 4 as it existed before the addition of subdivision (i), was its failure to
take into account the possible objections of foreign sovereigns. 4 ' Although
Rule 4(i) nowpermits service of process in a manner prescribed by the internal law of the foreign nation,4 2 it does not go so far as to mandate that
service not be performed by a method objectionable to the foreign country.
Thus as Rule 4 now stands, American plaintiffs will probably only respect
43
the sovereignty of a foreign nation when it is to their benefit to do so.
Additionally, for those American plaintiffs who want to serve process in a
non-objectionable manner, Rule 4(i) by itself provides no guidance or information concerning the attitudes or practices of foreign governments."
American litigants are forced to independently ascertain which Rule 4
methods of service are permissible under the laws of the applicable foreign
nation.45
Another major problem which persisted was that the individual American states continued to have disparate service of process procedures. Foreign litigants faced the unenviable task of dealing with the separate
jurisdictional procedures of forty-eight states. 46 American plaintiffs suing
in state courts, moreover, were not uniformly able to employ the kind of
wide range of service methods offered by Rule 4(i).47 Because the Federal
Rules only apply to federal court proceedings, any relief offered by Rule 4(i)
was not extended to state court litigants.
For all its significance, Public Law 88-619 was also not without its
shortcomings. Although it liberally allowed foreigners to serve process
within the United States, 4 8 it did not secure a mutual commitment from any
other foreign nation pertaining to American service of process within their

41. See Smit, supra note 1, at 1032.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(A). See also supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
43. American litigants would most likely take notice of foreign laws only if they needed to
have a judgment recognized in the foreign sovereign's courts.
44. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i).

45. See Jones, supra note 17, at 536.
46. See supra note 19.
47. Although various states had from early on adopted comprehensive sets of rules regarding
service of process outside the state, there was no nationwide uniformity. The Uniform Interstate
and International Procedure Act (UIIPA) was drafted through the cooperation of various committees and finally adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in 1962. The UIIPA, similar in structure to Rule 4(i), has not found widespread acceptance
among the states. See The Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, supra note 17, at

418.
48. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
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sovereign jurisdiction.4 9 Without any foreign recognition of the propriety
of Rule 4(i) service methods, American litigants could not escape the problem of choosing a proper manner of service. Foreign litigants, therefore,
still sought a unitary mechanism to deal with service of process within the

United States. American litigants, conversely, wanted a liberal recognition
of the validity of their service methods.5 0 To accomplish the objectives of
both parties, the unitary approach of an international convention was undoubtedly the only solution. 1
III.

FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING THE PROVISIONS OF THE
CONVENTION

A.

Overview of the Covention

The Hague Convention, which significantly alters service of process between litigants of the United States and all other signatory nations, was a
product of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.52
Although the United States had become a permanent member of the Conference just one year prior to the Convention's drafting,5 3 its suggestions,
reflective of a liberal attitude towards service of process, had a substantial
effect on the ultimate text of the Convention.54 This multilateral treaty on
international judicial procedure, the first ever to be joined by the United
49. See Amram, supra note 40, at 651 ("the sponsors of [Pub. L. 88-619] were not unmindful
of the need for parallel action abroad, so that United States courts and litigants could expect the
same generous treatment").
50. See Downs, supra note 34, at 128-30.
51. Many authorities were skeptical as to the feasibility of entering such a multilateral treaty.
See, eg., Jones, supra note 17, at 561, commenting on the techniques for international judicial
reform:
This brings us to the problem of whether.., a multilateral convention should be adopted.
Theoretically, a single universal code of international practice, rather than a large number
of codes, would be preferable. But experienced international practitioners think it win not
be possible to come to terms with the civil law governments except upon a country by
country basis.
52. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 55 U.S.L.W.
4842, 4844 (U.S. June 15, 1987); Amram, Report on the Tenth Session of the Hague Conference on
Private InternationalLaw, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 87 (1965); Graveson, The Tenth Session of the
Hague Conference of PrivateInternationalLaw, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 528 (1965).
53. In 1956 and 1960, the United States sent an official observer delegation to the Hague
Conference. See Amram, A Unique Organization: The Conference on PrivateInternationalLaw,
43 A.B.A. J. 809 (1957); Dezendorf, The Ninth Session of the Hague Conference on Private InternationalLaw, 47 A.B.A. J. 909 (1961). In 1963, President Johnson authorized the United States to
become a full member of the Conference. Downs, supra note 34, at 127-28.
54. Pub. L. 88-619 had by "remarkable coincidence" been passed just four days prior to the
Conference's opening session. The United States delegation presented the text of Pub. L. 88-619,
the liberal philosophy of which obviously impacted on the final draft of the Convention. See
Amram, supra note 40, at 652.
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States, established a mandatory5 5 scheme for the "effective, expeditious and
inexpensive service of legal documents abroad.",5 6 However, because the
Convention only binds its signatory parties, it leaves unaffected the procedures American litigants must follow when serving process in nonsignatory
foreign countries. 57
In broad terms, the Convention has two main effects. First, it provides
transnational litigants with a number of methods for the service of documents abroad, any of which can be used so long as they are not incompatible with the internal laws of the receiving nation.58 Guidance as to which
methods are not permissible is for the most part contained within the Convention itself.59 Second, the Convention regulates the judicial granting of,
and relief from, default judgments to ensure that "due process" considerations are met.6A
The permissible methods for serving documents abroad can be broken
down into three categories. First, every signatory nation must designate a
"Central Authority" through which foreign litigants can always serve process.6 1 Service via the Central Authority is the principal method established by the Convention; it is an innovation constituting the heart and soul
of this multilateral treaty.6 2 Second, the Convention provides a number of

55. See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text for discussion of the scheme's mandatory
nature. One of the fundamental differences between the Service Convention and its "sister" Evidence-Taking Convention drafted five years later, see Multilateral Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No.
744, is the use of discretionarylanguage in the Evidence-Taking Convention. See, e.g., Societe
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 55 U.S.L.W. 4842, 4845-46 n. 15
(U.S. June 15, 1987); Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik und Eisengieberei GmbH v. Starcher, 328
S.E.2d 492 (W. Va. 1985); Sadoff, The Hague Evidence Convention: Problems at Home of Obtaining Foreign Evidence, 20 INT'L LAW. 659, 672 (1986).
56. Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Special Commission on the Operation of the Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicialand ExtrajudicialDocuments in Civil
or Commercial Matters, 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 312, 313 (1978) [hereinafter U.S. Delegation

Report].
57. Thus, Federal Rule 4 and Pub L. 88-619 still play a pivotal role in international service of
process.
58. Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 19, 24 and 25.
59. Article 21 of the Convention requires that any objections which signatory parties may
have to the use of certain methods be set out in the signatory's declaration to the Convention. Id.
at art. 21. But cf infra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
60. Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 15 and 16.
61. Id. at art. 2.
62. See Report on the Work of the Special Commission on the Operation of the Convention of
15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and ExtrajudicialDocuments in Civil or
CommercialMatters, 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 319, 320-21 (1978) [hereinafter PermanentBureau

Report].
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other service methods (for example mail, consular or diplomatic)63 which
litigants may employ unless the receiving nation specifically objects to their
use.' Third, the Convention authorizes litigants to use any other method
of service which the receiving nation has expressly permitted, as evidenced
by prior international agreements or as reflected in the internal law of the

foreign nation.65
The provisions of the Convention concerning default judgments are
equally important in that they basically insure that a defendant will not
default unless he or she has had notice of the action.6 6 This incorporation
of the American concept of due process in the Convention was a momentous step in bridging the common and civil law systems for the purpose of
service of process abroad.67
B.

Convention as the Supreme Law of the Land

1. The Supremacy Clause
Properly construing the provisions of the Hague Convention requires a
fundamental understanding of the United States Constitution. The second
clause of article VI establishes that treaties are the supreme law of the land
and are binding upon the states.6 8 As long as treaties are self-executory, 69
they take effect as domestic law immediately upon their ratification.7 0 The
Hague Convention has been held to have the status of a treaty7 1 and, as

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 8-10.
Id.
Id. at arts. 11, 19, 24, 25.
Id. at arts. 15, 16.
See Amram, supra note 40, at 652-53.
68. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the Land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.
69. A self-executing treaty is one which establishes affirmative and judicially enforceable
obligations without requiring any implementing legislation. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102,
119 (1933); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
70. Although the Constitution does not discuss the nature of a treaty, the courts have recognized that two types of treaties exist. One type is self-executory. See supra note 69. The second
type, executory, require implementing legislation before they take effect. See Foster v. Neilson, 27
U.S. 108, 121 (1829).
71. E.g., Ex parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d 880, 882 (Ala. 1983); Dr.
Ing. H.C.F. Prosche A.G. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 755, 757-58, 177 Cal. Rptr. 155,
156 n.1 (1981).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:649

such, is put on an equal footing with the federal laws of the United States. 2
The Convention has likewise been determined to be self-executory. 7 3
The power of the President and the Senate to make treaties has been
expressly granted by the Constitution without limitations.7 4 The courts,
however, have required that treaties be interpreted subject to implied constitutional limitations.7 5 Thus, as long as a treaty does not derogate from
rights granted in other parts of the Constitution, it will be upheld as the
supreme law of the land. The validity of the Convention primarily depends
on whether its provisions afford litigants adequate notice or due process of
the law.7 6 No court has yet to challenge the Convention on grounds of its
violating the fourteenth amendment.
2.

Preemption of State Law

The supremacy clause mandates that state laws be held subordinate to
the treaties of the United States.7 7 Although the tenth amendment reserves
nondelegated powers to the several states, 8 treaty making powers are expressly delegated to the President in section two of article

79
1J.

Unless

constitutionally prohibited, a treaty can regulate any matter notwithstanding the laws of the states.8 0 Where state service of process procedures have
been in direct conflict with the Hague Convention, courts have been compelled to recognize the supremacy of the Convention's provisions.8 1
72. Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194; Foster, 27 U.S. at 121.
73. E.g., Vorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 575 (4th Cir. 1983); Pochop v. Toyota
Motor Co., 111 F.R.D. 464, 465 (S.D. Miss. 1986); Weight v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 597 F.
Supp. 1082, 1085 (E.D. Va. 1984); Rissew v. Yamaha Motor Co., 129 A.D.2d 94, -, 515
N.Y.S.2d 352, 354 (App. Div. 1987); Cipolla v. Picard Porsche Audi, Inc., 496 A.2d 130, 132
(R.I. 1985).
74. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
75. On its face, it is unclear whether the supremacy clause subjects treaties to any constitutional limitations. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (suggesting that treaties are equal
to the Constitution). The Supreme Court squarely addressed this matter in Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 16 (1957), stating that "no agreement with a foreign nation can ... [be] free from the
restraints of the Constitution."
76. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of due process standards and the Hague Convention, see Note, An Interpretation of the Hague Convention on the
Service Abroad of Judicialand ExtrajudicialDocuments Concerning PersonalService in Japan, 6
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 143, 144-45 (1983).
77. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942).
78. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
79. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
80. Although states exercise control over most of their internal activities, a treaty will override such power. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920). See also Nielsen v. Johnson,
279 U.S. 47 (1929) (treaties are binding within the territorial limits of the states).
81. E.g., Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1986); Geick v. American
Honda Motor Co., 117 F.R.D. 123, 124 (C.D. Ill. 1987); Weight v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 597
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A problem arises, however, when it is less than clear that a treaty actu-

ally conflicts with state regulations. Where it has been uncertain as to
whether federal laws were in conflict with those of the state, the judicial
branch has traditionally looked at the congressional "intent" to preempt a
field of regulation. 2 Congressional intent may be inferred from the pervasiveness of a federal scheme8 3 or a need for uniformity.8 4 The Supreme
Court has noted, however, that "the exercise of federal supremacy is not to
be lightly presumed." 5
Crucial to the determination of whether a treaty preempts state law,
therefore, will be the court's analysis of the national policies being advanced
by the treaty.8 6 Courts interpreting the Hague Convention have for the
most part agreed that policy considerations favoring the enforcement of

state service of process rules do not outweigh those favoring enforcement of
the multilateral treaty. 7 Many of the Convention's grey areas have yet to
be tested, however, and a balancing of interests might tip in favor of preserving state procedures.8 8
F. Supp. 1082, 1085-86 (E.D. Va. 1984); Harris v. Browning-Ferris Indus. Chem. Servs., 100
F.R.D. 775, 777 (M.D. La. 1984); Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 434 So. 2d 766, 769-70 (Ala. 1983);
Kadota v. Hosogai, 125 Ariz. 131, _, 608 P.2d 68, 71-73 (Ct. App. 1980); Luciano v. Garvey
Volkswagen, Inc., 521 N.Y.S.2d 119 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1987); Rissew v. Yamaha Motor Co., 129
A.D.2d 94, _, 515 N.Y.S.2d 352, 354 (1987); Aspinall's Club Ltd. v. Aryeh, 86 A.D.2d 428,
450 N.Y.S.2d 199, 202 (1982); Sandoval v. Honda Motor Co., 527 A.2d 564, 566 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987); Cipolla v. Picord Audi, Inc., 496 A.2d 130, 132 (R.I. 1985); but cf.Newport Components
v. NEC Home Elecs., 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1542 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (" 'resort to the convention
should be considered in each case,' but need not 'be utilized first in every case'" (citation omitted)); Vause v. Vause, 140 Wis. 2d 157, 162 (Ct. App. 1987) (Convention "is not the exclusive
vehicle for the service of process").
82. See, eg., New York State Dep't. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973)
(Congress must clearly manifest its intention to preempt state law).
83. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracket, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
84. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1961) (uniform national immigration laws
occupied the field so as to preempt state regulation).
85. Dublino, 413 U.S. at 413.
86. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942) (treaties must effectuate an important national policy so as not to derogate authority from the states); cf Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 55 U.S.L.W. 4842, 4848 (U.S.June 15, 1987)
(court decision whether to apply non-mandatory Evidence Convention depends on case-by-case
international "comity" analysis).
87. E.g., Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1986); Aspinall's Club Ltd. v.
Akulsh, 86 A.D.2d 428, -, 450 N.Y.S.2d 199, 202 (1982).
88. See infra notes 291-95 and accompanying text.
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Preemption of Federal Law

Treaties and acts of Congress are placed on the same footing and courts
should always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both.8 9 The
Constitution, however, provides no solution for the dilemma arising when
provisions of a treaty actually conflict with federal laws.9 ° The courts have
generally resolved this problem by invoking the "doctrine of implied repeal" which states that the enactment later in time prevails. 9
Courts construing the Hague Convention have generally held that
where a conflict exists, the treaty preempts Federal Rule 4.92 Many courts
93
have done so on the basis that the Convention was enacted later in time.
A more effective approach to the Rule 4 preemption problem was set out in
Harris v. Browning-FerrisIndustries Chemical Services.94 There a federal
district court determined that the Hague Convention was specifically aimed
at service of process in the signatory foreign nations and was thus controlling over the general Federal Rules which cover all circumstances.9" This
line of reasoning appears to be superior. For as is normally the case in
statutory construction, the specific controls over the general regardless of
the enactment dates of the conflicting provisions.

89. E.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).

90. See U.S.

CONST.

art. VI, cl. 2.

91. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933); Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194.
92. E.g., Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1986); Vorhees v. Fisher &

Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 576 (4th Cir. 1983); Cooper v. Makita, U.S.A., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 16, 17 (D.
Me. 1987); Hartley v. Wheatherford Crane Co., No. 86-0758 (E.D. Pa. filed Sept. 24, 1986);
Brown v. Bellaplast Maschinenbau, No. 84-1865 n.1 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 1986); Steinman v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., No. 80-2725-S (D. Mass. Feb. 10, 1984).
In three early cases the courts proposed that the Convention did not "abrogate" the provisions
of Rule 4. See supra note 6 and accompanyning text. A plethora of writers unfortunately read
that to mean that the Convention did not preempt Rule 4 when the two were in conflict. See, e.g.,
Horlick, A PracticalGuide to Service of United States Process Abroad, 14 INT'L LAW. 637, 646-47
n.33 (1980); Note, supra note 76, at 151-53; Note, Service Abroad of Judicialand Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters under the Hague Convention, 3 REV. LITIG. 493, 50710 (1983) [hereinafter Note Rev. Litig.]; cf. Note, InternationalService of Process: A Guide to
Serving ProcessAbroad Under the Hague Convention, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 287, 288-90 (1986) [hereinafter Okla. Note]; Note, InternationalLaw: Method of Service of InternationalDocuments Upon
Citizens of Signatory Nations of the Hague Convention, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 396, 398 (1986).
Even the Justice Department appears to have misread these cases. See Justice Dep't Memorandum, supra note 11, at 13 n.10 ("[tihe Convention machinery does not preempt other methods of
service").
93. E.g., Vorhees, 697 F.2d at 575-76. The implied repeal argument may run afoul, however,
in that Congress has amended Rule 4 since the Convention's ratification in 1969. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 4.
94. 100 F.R.D. 775 (M.D. La. 1984).
95. Id. at 777-78.
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4. Ackermann Approach to Preemption
The resolution of state and federal preemption problems becomes most
difficult when a treaty is silent as to the regulation of some important matter and some type of law must be supplied to fill the gap. If there is federal
law on point, the supremacy clause would seem to call for its implementation, barring any obstacles that may present to the achievement of the overall objectives of the treaty. 6 When that gap must be filled by procedural
law, however, the result is more problematic. A state court, in interpreting
treaty provisions, could find itself in the anomalous position of applying
federal procedural law.9 7
In Ackermann v. Levine, 98 a federal court of appeals addressed this
problem as it related to filling the gaps in the Hague Convention. 99 Faced
with the dilemma of whether state or federal procedural law should be used
to fill the "interstices" of the Convention, the court held that "where the
Convention provides a rule of decision, that rule is dispositive .... [but]
where the Convention is silent, federal law should govern where possible."'" The court reasoned that a contrary holding would burden foreign
litigants with the "procedural intricacies of fifty states" and generally
subordinate the policy considerations of the Convention to the less compelling state service requirements.101
The Ackermann approach appears to be fundamentally sound and
whenever possible should be used to construe the provisions of the Hague
Convention. The underlying policy of the Convention - to provide a unitary set of procedures for the service of process abroad - would be
thwarted if state service regulations were superimposed on the provisions of
the Convention.° 2 Enforcing federal procedural law in state courts, though
96. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
97. The use of federal law to bind state courts, when such is not constitutionally or congressionally mandated, is a choice of law technique commonly referred to as "Reverse-Erie." See K.
CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE 232-34 (1982).
98. 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986).
99. In Ackermann, a foreign plaintiff served process on a New York defendant through the
mail as permitted by article 10(a) of the Convention. See infra notes 197-207 and accompanying
text. While simple mail service is in and of itself sufficient under the Convention, New York

service of process law only allowed mail service in conjunction with personal delivery. Ackermann v. Levine, 610 F. Supp. 633, 643-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd in part, 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir.
1986).
100. In actuality, the court never applied federal law because article 10(a) was deemed dispositive. Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 840.

101. Id. The court's citation of Hanna v. Plumer, 38C U.S. 460, 469 (1965) in support of its
policy argument, Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 840, seems indicative of a "Reverse-Erie" analysis. See
infra note 103 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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somewhat of an anomaly, has been done when areas of great federal concern were involved. 103
IV.

THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION

With the preceding historical and constitutional background in mind, a
thorough analysis of the provisions of the Convention will follow. For
functional purposes, the Convention will be broken down into four basic
areas: (A) purpose and scope (preamble and article 1); 14 (B) methods of
service (articles 2-11, 19, 24-25);105 (C) "due process" guarantees (articles
15-16); 106 and (D) administrative and other provisions (articles 12-13, 1718, 20-23, 26-31).107 Additionally, a fifth section will be explored: (E)
problem areas.10 8
A.

Purpose and Scope

1. Preamble: Purpose
The objectives of the Convention are basically twofold. To alleviate the
problems transnational litigants have historically faced,' 0 9 the treaty provides a mechanism which (1) simplifies and expedites the service of documents abroad,"' and (2) guarantees that service will be brought to the
notice of the recipient in sufficient time to defend."' The Convention,
therefore, not only aims to solve the problem of lack of uniformity in international judicial assistance by creating an effective and expeditious sys103. See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952); Brown v. Western
Ry., 338 U.S. 294 (1949) (state courts must employ federal procedures to effectuate federal
claims). A "Reverse-Erie" analysis basically balances state and federal interests. Due to the
strong need for national uniformity when enforcing treaty provisions, federal procedural law
should supplement the Hague Convention when needed. See Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 840.
104. See infra notes 109-30 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 131-234 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 235-65 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 266-77 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 278-305 and accompanying text. It should be reemphasized that to interpret the provisions of the Hague Convention, one must focus on the treaty's text or plain language

as well as its history. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist.
Court, 55 U.S.L.W. 4842, 4845-47 (U.S. June 15, 1987).
109. See supra notes 20-40 and accompanying text.
110. Convention, supra note 4, at preamble. See U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 56, at
312.
111. Convention, supra note 4, at preamble. See PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 28.

See also, e.g., McHugh v. International Components Corp., 188 Misc. 2d 489,
166, 167 (1983).

-,

461 N.Y.S.2d
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tern, 112 but also addresses the due process considerations which American
litigants must always bear in mind." 3
The Convention, however, is not a long-arm device which provides independent authorization for service of process abroad. In DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers,Inc.," 4 a federal court of appeals determined that the
Convention, like Federal Rule 4, offers appropriate methods for serving
process only when a state long-arm rule or other federal statute authorizes
service abroad." 5 A basis for jurisdiction over the foreign defendant must
always be established independent of the Convention. The purpose of the
Convention is to provide a mechanism to effectuate notice, not to regulate

amenability. 116
2.

Article 1: Scope

The Hague Convention is applicable whenever "there is occasion to
'
transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad."117
The
difference between judicial and extrajudicial documents is that the latter are
not directly connected with lawsuits, but in contrast to "purely private
acts" they require the intervention of a "judicial officer" or "authority"
under the provisions of the Convention. 8
112. See, e.g., Amram, supra note 40, at 651-52.
113. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The Convention appears to have been drafted
with the Milliken and Mullane notice requirements in mind. See Amram, supra note 40, at 652
(suggesting that the Convention moves civil law countries in the direction of "our concept of due
process").
114. 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
115. Id. at 289. Service may be made under Rule 4(e) only "[w]henever a statute of the
United States or an order of court thereunder" or "a statute or rule of court of the state in which
the district court is held" provides for service on a party who is not an inhabitant of or found
within the forum state. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)). Service under Rule 4(i), of course, can
only be effectuated when Rule 4(e) authorizes it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1).
116. The court in DeJames remarked that it did "not believe that the treaty in any way
affect[ed] a state's chosen limits on the jurisdictional reach of its courts." DeJames, 654 F.2d at
289. This appears to be technically incorrect.
To be subject to a court's in personam jurisdiction, a defendant must (1) be amenable - i.e.,
have minimum contacts with the forum state, see International Shoe Co., v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945), and (2) have been given reasonable notice of the pendency of the action, see
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950). It is only this second
prong of the jurisdictional test - the notice giving - which the Hague Convention addresses.
States however, when unable to demand compliance with their service procedures due to their
preemption by the Hague Convention, have effectively lost control of one of the elements they use
to limit their jurisdictional reach. Only amenability limitations then remain.
117. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 1. See Graveson, supra note 52, at 539 (suggesting that
the phrase "there is occasion" is the most ambiguous in the Convention). See also note 130.
118. Permanent Bureau Report, supra note 62, at 327-28. Examples of extrajudicial documents are "demands for payment" and "notices to quit in connection with leaseholds." Id.
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By its terms, the Convention is only applicable to cases "in civil or commercial matters."' 1 9 No agreement exists as to the meaning of this phrase
with nearly every signatory nation interpreting it in its own way.12 There
does seem to be an across-the-board consensus, however, that this excludes
"criminal" matters. Furthermore, the contracting nations have agreed to
try to be as liberal as possible with the servicing of documents. 12' The Convention is also inapplicable when the address of the person to be served is
unknown,2 2 freeing American plaintiffs to use other state or federal methods of service, such as publication.
Article 1 makes it very clear that when the Convention is otherwise
applicable, its terms "shall" apply. 123 The use of mandatory language' 24
should dispel any doubt as to whether the Convention is the "exclusive"
means of service of process or merely "supplemental" in nature.125 Concep119. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 1.
120. PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 30. For example, the French exclude "criminal" and "fiscal" matters from this definition while the Egyptians exclude "matters of personal
status." U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 56, at 315-16.
121. PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 30. The United States will not apply the Convention to documents relating only to criminal proceedings. Justice Dep't Memorandum, supra
note 11, at 5.
122. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 1. See Bethke v. Bethke, 676 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984) (question of fact whether address was unknown making, summary judgment on art. 1 claim
inappropriate); cf. Quaranta v. Merlini, 192 Cal. App. 3d 22, -, 237 Cal. Rptr. 179, 181 (1987)
(service via the Convention not effected because defendant could not be located at given address).
123. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 1.
124. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. In a recent United States Supreme Court
decision, the Court clearly distinguished the use of discretionary language in the Evidence-Taking
Convention from the use of mandatory language in the Service Convention. See Societe Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 55 U.S.L.W. 4842, 4845-46 n. 15 (U.S. June
15, 1987).
125. The "no abrogation of rule 4" - language of early cases, see supra note 6, led many to
believe that the Convention's service methods were only supplemental. E.g., Justice Dep't Memorandum, supra note 11, at 13 n. 10; Jones, InternationalService of Process Requirements in U.S.
District Court, 26 N.H.B.J. 39, 43 (1984). A state court of appeals recently came to the same
conclusion. See Vause v. Vause, 140 Wis. 2d 157, 162 (Ct. App. 1987). See also Newport Components v. NEC Home Elecs., 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1542 (C.D. Cal. 1987). The majority of courts,
however, consider the Convention's provisions to be exclusive and controlling. See, e.g., Kadota
v. Hosogai, 125 Ariz. 131, -, 608 P.2d 68, 71 (Ct. App. 1980).
The recent Supreme Court decision in Societe should render the "exclusivity" issue moot. The
Court noted that the mandatory language of the Service Convention provided a "model exclusivity provision" that the drafters of the Evidence Convention declined to follow. Societe, 55
U.S.L.W. at 4846 n. 15. The clear import of the decision is that the Service Convention, in contrast to the Evidence Convention, "require[s] its use to the exclusion of any other [service] procedures." Id. at 4845. In typical fashion, however, one court recently interpreting the Service
Convention's "exclusivity provision" in light of the Societe decision, confuses the issue of
"mandatory usage" with that of "strict compliance." See A.I.M. Int'l, Inc. v. Battenfield Extrusions Sys., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 633, 638-39 (M.D. Ga. 1987) (exclusivity clause may call for strict
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tually, this difference is critical because through the supremacy clause, the
Convention supersedes all conflicting state and federal methods of service
abroad.26 In practical terms, however, its significance is mitigated by the
fact that another provision of the Convention specifically allows for the implementation of a number of state and federal methods. 127
Finally, because the Convention only governs "where there is occasion
'
the courts have unito transmit a ... document for service abroad,"128
formly found the Convention's procedures inapplicable when an American
serves process on a foreign corporation's common law agent located in the
United States.129 In order to address this critical issue as to whether the
Convention's procedures can be avoided by serving process on a local agent,
compliance with Convention procedures or call for first, but not exclusive use of Convention
procedures). See also Newport, 671 F. Supp. at 1542; infra note 179.
126. See supra notes 81, 92 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 225-34 and accompanying text.
128. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 1.
129. See, eg., Zisman v. Sieger, 106 F.R.D. 194, 199-200 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 104 F.R.D. 95, 96-97 (S.D. Fla. 1985) ("[t]here is nowhere among the
provisions of the Hague Convention any indication that it is to control attempts to serve process
on foreign corporations or agents of foreign corporations within the State of origin"); Ex parte
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d 880, 882 (Ala. 1983); Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft, 145 Ill. App. 3d 594, _, 495 N.E.2d 1114, 1115-17 (App. Ct. 1986), cert.
granted,56 U.S.L.W. 3262 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1987) (No. 86-1052) ("if target for service can be found
within the state there is simply no occasion for service abroad"); Luciano v. Garvey Volkswagen,
Inc., 521 N.Y.S.2d 119, 120-21 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1987); McHugh v. International Components
Corp., 188 Misc. 2d 489, _, 461 N.Y.S.2d 166, 167-68 (1983); cf. Geick v. American Honda
Motor Co., 117 F.R.D. 123 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (service on agent within United States obviates use of
Convention but local subsidiary not found to be "registered agent" under applicable state law);
Mommsen v. Toro Co., 108 F.R.D. 444 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (Convention's provisions apply because
no common law agency relationship established); Low v. Bayerische Motoren Werke A.G., 88
A.D.2d 504, -, 449 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735-36 (App. Div. 1982) (Convention's provisions apply because no common law agency relationship established).
Conversely, when an American serves process on a foreign corporation's "statutorily-appointed" agent, as distinguished from a "common law" agent, the courts have uniformly held that
service is not valid until the Convention's procedures are followed. See, eg., Mommsen v. Toro
Co., 108 F.R.D. 444, 444-45 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (plaintiff served process on Iowa Secretary of State
and mailed copy to defendant abroad contrary to provisions of Convention); Harris v. BrowningFerris Indus. Chem. Servs., 100 F.R.D. 775, 777 (M.D. La. 1984) (plaintiff served process on
Louisiana Secretary of State who then forwarded documents to defendant contrary to Convention); Cipolla v. Picard Porsche Audi, Inc., 496 A.2d 130, 131-32 (R.I. 1985) (plaintiff served
process on Rhode Island Secretary of State and not in accordance with Convention); cf. Dr. Ing.
H.C.F. Porsche v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 755, -, 177 Cal. Rptr. 155, 159 (Ct. App.
1981) (defendant's agent for service of process under National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act not a common law agent).
Common law agency theories, which vary from state to state, most often focus on the degree of
control a parent corporation exercises over the subsidiary. See, e.g., Lamb, 104 F.R.D. at 98-99.
See also Note, The Hague Service Convention and Agency Concepts: Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 391, 402-04 (1987) [hereinafter Cornell Note].
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the United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk.13 0

130. 145 Ill. App. 3d 594, 495 N.E.2d 1114 (App. Ct. 1986), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3262
(U.S. Oct. 13, 1987) (No. 86-1052).
In Schlunk, the plaintiff's parents were killed while driving a Volkswagen and thereafter the
plaintiff filed suit against various defendants, including Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
(VWAG), a West German corporation, and VWAG's wholly-owned American subsidiary, Volkswagen of America (VWOA). When the plaintiff served process on VWAG by serving its subsidiary VWOA, VWAG attempted to quash service for failure to follow the provisions of the Hague
Service Convention. An Illinois circuit court ruled that the Convention was inapplicable because
service did not take place outside the United States. An appellate court of Illinois affirmed that
decision stating that "[s]ince there [was] no occasion for service abroad ... the Hague Convention, by its own terms, [did] not apply." Schlunk, 145 Ill. App. 3d at -, 495 N.E.2d at 1115. The
court found that under Illinois common law, VWOA was an agent of VWAG for the purpose of
serving process due to the West German parent corporation's pervasive control over the American subsidiary. Id. at , 495 N.E.2d at 1123. The issue presented on appeal to the United States
Supreme Court is whether an American plaintiff can circumvent the Convention's procedures by
serving process on a foreign defendant's "common law" agent located in the United States.
When making its decision, the United States Supreme Court will undoubtedly go through the
same analysis it recently did when interpreting the Hague Evidence-Taking Convention. In Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 55 U.S.L.W. 4842, 4845
(U.S. June 15, 1987), the Court considered the "plain language" of the treaty as well as its "negotiating history." See supra notes 12 and 108. In Schlunk, therefore, the Service Convention
would be applicable only if there was "occasion to transmit a ... document for service abroad."
See Convention, supra note 4, at art. 1. The plaintiff will probably argue that there is no "service
abroad" because service is valid and complete upon delivery of the documents to the foreign
defendant's U.S.-based agent. The defendant, on the other hand, might argue that the agent must
still notify the foreign-based principal and thus there is "occasion to transmit" the documents for
the ultimate service abroad. It would appear that the plaintiff's argument is stronger because
service of process should be valid when an agent properly accepts service and not when the principal is ultimately notified. See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
Further support for the plaintiff's position can be drawn from a somewhat tenuous analogy to the
courts' interpretation of the "Taking of Evidence Abroad" Convention. The Evidence Convention
surely is not applicable to the discovery of evidence in the control of a foreign defendant but
located within the United States. See, e.g., In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782
F.2d 120, 124 (8th Cir. 1986), affid in part, rev'd in part, 55 U.S.L.W. 4842 (U.S. June 15, 1987).
Because Nation-states exercise judicial sovereignty over their territory, if service of process is
physically completed on United States territory, then the service, like U.S.-based discovery,
should not be subject to the Hague Convention.
If the United States Supreme Court decides to follow the uniform rulings of lower courts
regarding service of process on "common law" agents, it would probably have to distinguish or
reject the lower courts' contrary decisions regarding "statutorily-appointed" agents. See supra
note 129. Because the courts have ruled that the Convention's provisions must be adhered to even
after a statutorily-appointed agent has been properly served, the Supreme Court might have to
resolve the issue as to why service of process in this case is not completed and valid until the
foreign defendant is ultimately notified. One possible answer is that "common law" agents and
"statutorily-appointed" agents appear to be fundamentally different. Common law agency principles normally demand that a parent/subsidiary relationship be so close that it is reasonably certain that service on the agent will give adequate notice to the parent-principal. See Lamb, 104
F.R.D. at 101. Service of process on the "alter ego" - agent, therefore, is in effect service on the
principal. Statutorily-created agency relationships, on the other hand, do not reflect the same
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B.

Methods of Service

There are three categories of permissible service methods set out in the
Convention.13 1 Process can be served by (1) the Central Authority, 132 (2)
various non-objectionable methods provided for in the Convention,133 or (3)

close nexus between agent and principal. A statutorily-appointed Secretary of State who receives
service of process for a foreign corporation, for example, is not so closely related that service on
him or her can be considered service on the foreign corporation. There is clearly no likelihood
that the foreign defendant will be given notice until the documents are physically forwarded
across transnational boundaries. It is for this reason that service of process on a statutorily-appointed agent must often be accompanied by a mailing of a set of the documents to the defendant.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3) (authorizing service of process on "any other agent authorized by
appointment or by law.., and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to receive service and the
statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the defendant").
In deciding whether service on a common law agent is or is not an "occasion to transmit a...
document for service abroad," the Supreme Court will also analyze the purpose and negotiating
history of the Service Convention. See Societe, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4845. The plaintiff and defendant
in Schlunk will undoubtedly make use of a number of catch-phrases when identifying the Convention's purpose. As stated before, the Convention sought to establish a unitaryapproach to international service of process by setting up simple, non-objectionable methods of service which would
not offend the due process rights of the litigants. Utmost respect, however, must be paid to each
signatory's territorialandjudicial sovereignty. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
The defendant in Schlunk will likely argue that circumventing the Convention's procedures by
serving process on an agent only destroys the unitaryapproach; foreign defendants are now forced
to deal with fifty disparate American states' common laws and statutory schemes regarding
agency. See supra note 19. The defendant might also argue that the simple, non-objectionable
manners of service are now replaced with one which is (1) complex and difficult for courts to
determine, (2) possibly objectionable to the foreign defendant's state (receiving Nation), and (3)
possibly in violation of the defendant's due process rights. In sum, the spirit of the Convention
and intent of its framers have been frustrated. See CornellNote, supra note 129, at 406-12.
The plaintiff in Schlunk, on the other hand, might argue that it was never the purpose of the
Convention to invade a signatory's territorialandjudicial sovereignty. A foreign nation should
hardly object to service of process on a common law agent based in the United States because (1)
the foreign nation's own territorial and judicial sovereignty is not directly being breached, and (2)
the foreign nation is knowingly allowing its nationals to form (corporate) agency relationships
with U.S. entities, and thus acquiescing to America's sovereign judicial control. A foreign parent
corporation that purposefully creates an agency relationship with its U.S. subsidiary avails itself of
its legal rights in a particular state and accordingly must also recognize its legal duties under that
state's laws.
There is undeniably merit to both of these potential arguments. In determining which is
stronger, therefore, the United States Supreme Court might have to make as much a foreign policy
statement as a legal analysis. To be sure, an affirmation of the lower court's decision (Convention
inapplicable with service on common law agent) would be a forceful statement in defense of
American territorial and judicial sovereignty. As is the case when making an international "comity" analysis, the Supreme Court in Schlunk needs to balance international duty and convenience,
and the rights of all citizens under existing American laws. See Societe, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4848.
131. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
132. Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 2-6, 13.
133. Id. at arts. 8-10.
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any other method permitted by 1international
agreements or the internal law
34
of the receiving foreign nation.
1. Articles 2-7, 13: The Central Authority
The principal method of service provided in the Convention is the transmission of documents through the Central Authority. 35 Although it is not
the exclusive means of serving process, 136 a plaintiff may always resort to its
use if another method permitted by the Convention should fail. 137 Every
38
signatory nation to the Convention must designate a Central Authority.
Only a person properly authorized under the laws of the nation of origin
may forward service requests to the Central Authority of the receiving nation. 13 Under the laws of the various signatories, the range of persons authorized to forward service requests is very broad, though "private persons"
are specifically excluded from this right."' Because many parties to the
Convention perceive American attorneys as lacking such capacity, it has
been commonly agreed upon that attorneys should note on their service
request forms that they are "[a]uthorized under [United States] practice to
request service under the Convention."''
A summary of the document to be served,14 2 the document itself,14 3 and
a service request form" 4 must all be forwarded to the Central Authority. 145
If the request is defective in any way, the Central Authority of the receiving

134. Id. at arts. 11, 19, 24-25.
135. PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 32.

136. See, e.g., Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 839 (2d Cir. 1986); Kadota v. Hosagai,
125 Ariz. 131, -, 608 P.2d 68, 72 (Ct. App. 1980).
137. See Note, supra note 76, at 148 (Central Authority "may be thought of as a safety
valve").

138. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 2. In the United States, the Department of Justice
serves as the Central Authority. JusticeDep't Memorandum, supra note 11, at 6. Parties may also

establish additional Central Authorities. See infra note 271 and accompanying text.
139. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 3. As used in this Comment, the terms "nation of
origin" and "receiving nation" refer to the countries in which the "party serving process" and the
"party being served process on" are respectively located.
140. PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 36.
141. U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 56, at 316.
142. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5. See infra notes 164-72 and accompanying text for
discussion of language requirements.
143. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 3.
144. Id. Although the request form need not be notarized, it must, for uniformity's sake,
conform to the model which is annexed to the text of the Convention. See supra note 4 for list of
sources reprinting Convention.
145. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 3. Both the request and document must be sent in
duplicate.
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nation has the power to return it to the applicant for corrective action.14 6
1 47
Although the Central Authorities seldom come across any problems,
their agreement to serve "stale documents"' 4 8 has raised some due process
49
concerns. 1
Article 5 specifically sets forth two methods which can be used by a
Central Authority in serving process. First, the receiving nation's Central
Authority may formally effect service in any manner "prescribed by its internal law."' 50 Second, litigants may request that the Central Authority use
a "particular method" of service so long as it is not "incompatible" with the
151
laws of the receiving nation.
Regarding the first method of permissible service, the Convention's use
of the phrase "internal law" has proven problematic due to the American
federated judicial system. The issue of whether the United States Central
Authority must use a state service method as opposed to a method prescribed by federal law was squarely addressed in Aspinall's Club Ltd. v.
Aryeh. 152 In that case the Central Authority, via a United States Marshal,
served process in accordance with Federal Rule 4, but not according to the
stricter New York state requirements.' 53 The court, using a supremacy
clause argument, held that only the standards of the superseding Rule 4
54
need be met.1
146. Id. at art. 4. Although a receiving nation may also refuse to comply with a service
request if it feels that compliance therewith "would infringe its sovereignty or security," id. at art.
13, a request to the Central Authority as such "can never infringe upon sovereignty or security,
even if it concerns an institution that is not known by the requested State or to which it objects."
PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 33.

147. With discrepancies such as inaccurate or incomplete addresses, the Central Authorities
have in liberal fashion tried to effectuate service. See PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 31.
But in cases where a required language translation was missing or the request form was not in
conformity with the standard model, the Central Authorities have not hesitated to return the
documents. See, eg., Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 434 So. 2d 766, 769 (Ala. 1983).
148. A stale document is a service request received by a Central Authority only after the
expiration of the date of the hearing of which the foreign defendant is supposed to be given notice.
US. Delegation Report, supra note 56, at 317.
149. Because articles 15 and 16 give "due process" protection to litigants who have not received timely notice of a foreign proceeding, the Central Authorities felt it was in the best interests
of the defendant to be kept informed of the pendency of the legal proceedings, even if service is
late. See id.; PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 33. See also infra note 244 and accompanying text.
150. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5(a).
151. Id. at art. 5(b). See also S.E.C. v. Grossman, No. 87 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1987).
152. 86 A.D.2d 428, 450 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1982).
153. Id. at _, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 202. Rule 4 allows for the delivery of papers to a person of
suitable age and discretion at the target's residence. New York statutes required that there be a
concomitant mailing when process was served in such a manner. Id.
154. Id.
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Although the court in Aspinali's Club came to the correct conclusion,' 55
its analysis of the matter was less than thorough. The United States Central
Authority, for its part, should certainly be able to use either state or federal
law as it considers appropriate.1 56 Not only does this comply with the face
of article 5's "internal law" provision, but it also does not prejudice the
defendant-servee in any way.' 5 7 The American party being served, however, should not be able to demand that state service procedures be followed. This would defeat the basic purpose of the Convention which is to
create expediency and uniformity by eliminating the necessity of following
fifty different sets of service regulations.' 8
The Central Authority's second permissible method of service, the use
of "a particular method requested by the applicant,"' 5 9 was inserted in the
Convention to satisfy those doubting whether due process requirements
would be satisfied by use of the first method.' 60 Because the method re6
quested cannot be "incompatible with the law" of the receiving nation,1 1
foreign litigants utilizing this method in the United States should be mindful of the Aspinall's Club decision. Since the policy considerations are the
same, service should only have to be compatible with federal rules. Pursuant to this method of service, the Central Authority may always informally
deliver a document to a person who voluntarily acccepts it.162 This method
of service is known as "remise simple" and is commonly utilized in
63
Europe.1
The Central Authorities of the signatory nations may also impose translation requirements." 6 There are rather marked divergences in the practices of the contracting nations, some requiring the entire document to be
155. See Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming the holding that
service must satisfy federal but not state law).
156. Although U.S. Marshals typically serve process in conformity with Rule 4 when serving
under the Convention's provisions, state procedures are in some circumstances also followed. See
Justice Dep't Memorandum, supra note 11, at 8-9.
157. A defendant could normally expect to be served according to state procedures in either a

state or federal court proceeding. See FED. R. CIv. P. 4(e).
158. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
159. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5(b).
160. Amram, supra note 52, at 90. The delegates agreed at the Convention's drafting, however, that service according to the internal laws of the signatory nations would adequately guarantee sufficiency of notice. See PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 34.

161. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5(b).
162. Id. at art. 5. From the language used in paragraph two of article 5, it is difficult to
determine just how this provision is subject to sub-paragraph (b).
163. See PermanentBureau Report, supra note 62, at 323; Okla. Note, supra note 92, at 291-

92. See also note 221 discussing language requirements.
164. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5.
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translated while others require only the summary of the document. 165 The
failure to observe article 5 language requirements has contributed to the
quashing of service in a number of cases. 166 It is likely that regardless of
whether there is actual notice of the pendency of an action, the courts will
167
adversely react to a failure to translate when it is specifically required.
Article 7 of the Convention imposes additional language requirements.
It mandates that all the standard terms of the service request form be written in French or English and that the corresponding blanks be completed in
either the language of the nation addressed or in French or English.16 8 The
fact that an American could be served with documents written entirely in
French raises obvious due process concerns. In Julen v. Larson,'6 9 a California appellate court found service of process on an American to be defective when all the legal documents were written in German.1 70 As the court
in Julen noted, legally sufficient notice in light of due process considerations
probably requires that at least the summary of documents be written in
English. 171 For these reasons the standard terms of the request form
72
should, at a minimum, be written in French and English.1
Finally, article 6 sets forth the proof of service requirements when the
Central Authority has been used. Proof of service according to the Convention's provisions has been held to supersede more stringent state requirements. 173 Although federal rules should also be held subordinate,1 74 one
federal district court refused to recognize the mandatory nature of article 6.
In Fox v. Regie Nationale des Usines Renault,175 the court held that because
failure to make proof of service does not affect the validity of service under
Federal Rule 4, the Convention's mandatory provisions need not be strictly
165. PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 34-35. Oddly enough, the signatory nations'
declarations appended to the Convention's text are incomplete as to article 5 language requirements. The PRACTICAL HANDBOOK appears to be the only source with a complete listing of
objections. Id. at 46-89.
166. E.g., Harris v. Browning-Ferris Indus. Chem. Servs., 100 F.R.D. 775, 778 (M.D. La.
1984); Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 434 So. 2d 766, 769 (Ala. 1983).
167. But cf infra note 221 and accompanying text.
168. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 7.

169. 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1972).
170. Id. at 330, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 798-800. There was, of course, no evidence that the defendant understood German.
171. Id.
172. See Justice Dep't Memorandum, supra note 11, at 10; PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra
note 4, at 37.
173. MacIvor v. Volvo Penta of America, Inc., 471 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
174. See Bishop, supra note 1, at 1039.
175. 103 F.R.D. 453 (W.D. Tenn. 1984).
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applied where a defendant has, in any case, received actual notice of the
action. 176
The Fox decision raises a critical issue which is generally applicable to
the interpretation of most of the provisions of the Convention. As the court
correctly noted, the Convention "does not prescribe the procedure for the
forum [c]ourt to follow should an element of the procedure fail." 17 7 But
instead of focusing on the liberal nature of Rule 4 when finding a lack of
proof of service to be inconsequential, the court should have focused on the
purpose of the Convention itself. The Convention was indeed drafted in an
aura of liberalism, but adherence to formalistic procedures is nevertheless
necessary when the due process rights of a litigant or the sovereignty of a
nation are at stake. The mandatory proof of service requirement of article 6
appears primarily to safeguard the due process rights of the plaintiff, however. It gives notice to the plaintiff that his service request has been
processed. 178 Because the protective function of such a formalistic procedure only minimally addresses the due process rights of a party who has
been properly served, the court in Fox was probably justified in reaching its
decision. 179 Courts in the future should only allow a deviation from Convention procedures if it can clearly be established that Convention policies
are not being furthered by strict adherence to them.
2.

Articles 8-10: Other Service Methods Provided by the Convention

Generally speaking, articles 8-10 provide litigants with additional methods of service which may always be used unless the receiving nation has
specifically objected thereto. 8 ° Discerning these confusingly drafted provisions is somewhat difficult, however. Two key problems seem to underline
the confusion with this oft-litigated section of the Convention. 8 ' First, it is
176. Id. at 455.
177. Id.
178. Because state and federal rules generally place time restraints on the servicing of process,

it is critical that the plaintiff be properly appraised of the status of a service request. See infra
notes 278-79 and accompanying text.

179. Deviations from Convention procedures are generally not permitted. See infra notes
296-301 and accompanying text. But cf Cooper v. Makita, U.S.A., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 16, 17-18 (D.
Me. 1987) (citing Fox, 103 F.R.D. 453); A.I.M. Int'l, Inc. v. Battenfeld Extrusions Sys., Inc., 116
F.R.D. 633, 638-39 (M.D. Ga. 1987) (although Convention's "exclusivity clause" may insist upon
strict compliance, prior lower court decisions primarily focused on "substantial compliance");
Tax Lease Underwriters v. Blackwell Green, Ltd., 106 F.R.D. 595, 597 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (service
at address not specified by court order held inconsequential).
180. Article 9 appears to be an exception, however. Service according to its provisions should
always be available. See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
181. Over half of all published decisions on the Convention deal with some aspect of articles
8-10.
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unclear whether the Convention intends to create or authorize these methods of service regardless of whether they are valid under the internal law of
the nation of origin. Second, it is equally unclear how these methods of
service interrelate with one another and with the other provisions of the
Convention.
Article 8 provides that each signatory nation "shall be free" to serve
persons "without application of any compulsion directly through its diplomatic or consular agents."' 2 Although any receiving nation can declare
that it objects to such service, this manner will always be available to serve
process on a nation of origin's own nationals located abroad.' 8 3 The United
States, although not objecting to the use of this method by foreign nations
on American territory,"' 4 has specifically prohibited its own diplomatic and
consular missions from serving process abroad."8 To uphold such consular
regulation as valid, therefore, we must interpret the language of article 8 as
permitting the use of such method of service only if it is already authorized
by the internal law of the nation of origin. 6
Article 9 similarly provides that signatory parties "shall be free" to use
their consular and diplomatic channels to indirectly serve process by forwarding documents to specifically designated authorities in the receiving
nation.1 8 7 Article 9 does not specifically allow contracting nations to object
to the manner of service it provides. This appears to be permissive, as is true
with service via the Central Authority. As with article 8, however, article 9
will probably not be interpreted by the courts as authorizing a method of
service where one is not otherwise recognized by the internal law of the
nation of origin. Because many nations have actually designated their Cen182. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 8 (emphasis added). The phrase "without appplication
of any compulsion" has been held to refer to "compulsory process" such as orders to produce
documents or subpoenas. It does not refer to "notice process," such as the service of a summons
and complaint. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636
F.2d 1300, 1312-15 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
183. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 8. See Bethke v. Bethke, 676 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984).

184. Convention, supra note 4, at United States declaration.
185. JusticeDep't Memorandum, supra note 11, at 18. Consular regulations permit the service of process by officers of the Foreign Service in only limited circumstances. See 22 C.F.R.
§§ 92.85-92.94 (1986).
186. Although such a construction of article 8's provisions appears reasonable, the similar
language of article 10 has been interpreted by the courts in a contrary fashion. See infra notes
208-23 and accompanying text.
187. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 9.
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tral Authorities as "receiving authorities" under article 9,188 this method 89
of

service for all intents and purposes does not offer any new advantages.1
The methods of service provided for in article 10, to which receiving
nations can specifically object,' 90 have been a center of controversy. In particular, article 10(a), which preserves "the freedom to send judicial documents by postal channels, directly to persons abroad,"' 91 has proven to be
the single most litigated provision of the Convention. Oddly enough, attention has focused on whether 10(a) actually constitutes a valid method of

service.
Courts holding mail service not to be permissible under the Convention
have generally looked to the purported intent of the drafters as well as the
basic cannons of statutory construction. 92 In Ormandy v. Lynn, 193 the
court reasoned that because the word "service" appears everywhere else in
the Convention, the use of the word "send" in article 10(a) is an aberration
which must be accounted for by looking at the ordinary meaning of the
term. 194 The court noted that to liberally construe "send" as including "effective service of legal process would vitiate the fundamental intent of the
parties to establish more formal modes of service."' 95 In refusing to go
beyond the plain meaning of the word "send," courts following the Ormandy rationale have relegated article 10(a) to authorize no more than "the
mere transmittal of notices and legal documents which need not be 'served'
'
in the legal sense." 196

The majority of courts, to the contrary, have explicitly or implicitly recognized the validity of mail service via article 10(a). 19' The court in Shoei
188. See PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 92-131 (listing nations' designation under
article 9).
189. Cf id. at 39 (some experts feel service via article 9 speeds up the process while others feel
it brings on serious delay).
190. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 10.
191. Id. at art. 10(a) (emphasis added).
192. See, eg., Cooper v. Makita, U.S.A., Inc., 117 F.R.D. 16, 17 (D. Me. 1987); Pochop v.
Toyota Motor Co., 111 F.R.D. 464, 465-67 (S.D. Miss. 1986); Mommsen v. Toro Co., 108 F.R.D.
444, 445-46 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Rissew v. Yamaha Motor Co., 129 Misc. 2d 317, _, 493 N.Y.S.2d
78, 80-81 (1985), rev'd, 129 A.D.2d 94, 515 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1987).
193. 122 Misc. 2d 954, 472 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1984).
194. Id. at -, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
195. Id.
196. Reynolds v. Koh, 109 A.D.2d 97, -, 490 N.Y.S.2d 295, 297-98 (1985).
197. See, eg., Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 839-40 (2d Cir. 1986); Newport Components v. NEC Home Elecs., 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1541-42 (C.D. Cal. 1987); AIM Int'l, Inc. v.
Battenfeld Extrusions Sys., 116 F.R.D. 633, 638-39 (M.D. Ga. 1987); Hastings v. Graphic Sys.
Div. of Int'l Corp., No. 86-255-S (D. Kan. Mar. 30, 1987); Jenco v. Martech Int'l, No. 86-4229
(E.D. La. July 7, 1987); Great Am. Boat Co. v. Alsthom Atl., Inc., Nos. 84-0105, 84-5442 (E.D.
La. Apr. 8, 1987); Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456, 463-64 (E.D.N.Y.
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Kako Co. v. Superior Court,19 8 though having acknowledged "some merit to
the proposed distinction" between the use of the words "send" and "service," was convinced that the policy and scope of the Convention necessitated recognizing mail service. 199 The court reasoned that the provisions of

10(a) would be "superfluous" if their purpose was not to authorize mail
service because the "mails are [otherwise] open to all." 2" Furthermore, the
provisions of 10(a) are clearly set out in the context of other alternative
service methods.20 1
Courts deciding this issue in the future should uphold the validity of
mail service under 10(a). The strength of the Shoei Kako rationale is fortified by the weaknesses of the Ormandy decision. Although foreign nations
had certainly endeavored to establish an official channel in the United
States to effectuate service, Americans, in joining the Convention, clearly
had as their main objective the foreign recognition of liberal methods of
service.20 2 It was never the intent of the United States to be restricted to
"formal" methods of service. Every authoritative analysis of the Conven-

tion, 20 3 moreover, explicitly recognizes the establishment of mail service by
article 10(a). 2" Although courts must necessarily pay close attention to the
actual language used in a treaty, 20 it is the intent of the framers which
must be controlling.20 6 When all the signatories to the Convention them-

1986); Zisman v. Sieger, 106 F.R.D. 194, 199 (1985); Weight v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 597 F.
Supp. 1082, 1085 (E.D. Va. 1984); Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182,
1206 (D.C.C. 1984); Rissew v. Yamaha Motor Co., 129 A.D.2d 94, -, 515 N.Y.S.2d 352, 354-55
(App. Div. 1987); Russel v. Arthur Trask Co., 125 A.D.2d 136, _, 512 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577-78
(1987); Low v. Bayerische Motoren Werke A.G., 88 A.D.2d 504, _, 449 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735
(1982).
198. 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973).
199. Id. at 821, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 411.

200. Id.
201. Id. The court also suggested that a contrary holding would effectively abrogate the mail
provisions of Rule 4(i), a strange result in that Congress had not made note of the change in its
subsequent Rule 4 modifications. Id. at 822, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 412. This analysis is incorrect in
light of article 19's provisions. See infra notes 225-34 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. See also Downs, supra note 34, at 128-29.
203. Courts must give great weight to the meaning of treaties as interpreted by the departments of government encharged with their negotiation. See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187

(1961).
204. See U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 56, at 317; Permanent Bureau Report, supra
note 62, at 326; PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 39; Amram, supra note 40, at 653.
205. One Convention expert has come to the "inescapable" conclusion that the use of the
word "send" rather than "service" "must be attributed to careless drafting." B. RiSTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL) §
Rissew v. Yamaha Motor Co., 129 A.D.2d 94 -, 515 N.Y.S.2d

4-28, at 165-67 (1984). See also
352, 354 (App. Div. 1987).
206. See, e.g., Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 55
U.S.L.W. 4842, 4845 (U.S. June 15, 1987) (court should begin analysis with "text of the treaty and
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selves recognize that 10(a) provides for mail service, the courts should obviously do the same.2 °7
Assuming arguendo that article 10(a) does permit mail service, an
equally problematic issue remains to be addressed. Does the Convention
provide litigants with a right to use mail service even when this method is
not validly recognized under the internal laws of their nation? Although
this issue has not been squarely addressed, the decision reached in Ackermann v. Levine 208 may offer guidance to its resolution. There the court
held that regardless of whether Federal Rule 4 or state service requirements
are satisfied, the United States, in abstaining from objection to the provisions of article 10(a), has expressly permitted foreign litigants to use mail
service on American territory. 20 9 Because the Convention provides a "rule
of decision" concerning the validity of a manner of service, "that rule is
2 10
dispositive barring any contrary declaration by the United States.
The Ackermann holding may have a profound impact on the application
of the Hague Convention. Perhaps the only possible reading of the decision
is that article 10 authorizes methods of service which, if not objected to by a
receiving nation, may always be employed by plaintiffs of the nation of origin regardless of whether that method lacks a basis in the internal law of the
receiving nation or the nation of origin.2" Such an interpretation of Ackermann is implicitly supported by every court holding that the provisions of
212
the Convention preempt conflicting state and federal service procedures.
If courts cannot demand that mail service be in conformity with state or
federal rules, 1 3 there must be an implied recognition of an independent
basis for service under the Convention.
the context in which the written words are used"); cf. Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929)
(where language in a treaty is ambiguous, courts must liberally construe it to enlarge the rights
granted).
207. The various contracting nations which have objected to the use of 10(a) (e.g., Germany,
Norway), would certainly not have done so if the servicing of documents were not involved. See
O'Brien v. Bayer, A.G., No. 86-2091 (D. Kan. filed July, 1986); Tax Lease Underwriters v.

Blackwell Green, Ltd., 106 F.R.D. 595, 596 (E.D. Mo. 1985); R.M.B. Electrostat, Inc. v. Lectra
Trading A.G., No. 82-1844 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 1983); Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 434 So. 2d 766, 769
(Ala. 1983), Cintron v. W & D Mach. Co., 182 N.J. Super. 126, -, 440 A.2d 76, 81 (1981).
208. 788 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1986).
209. Id. at 840.
210. Id.
211. Prior to the Ackermann decision, various writers had expressly concluded the opposite.
See Bishop, supra note 1, at 1032 (suggesting that the provisions of article 10 "were not intended
to authorize service abroad by means of the methods specified therein unless internal law other-

wise authorizes these methods").
212. See supra notes 81, 92 and accompanying text.

213. See, e.g., Harris v. Browning-Ferris Indus. Chem. Servs., 100 F.R.D. 775, 777-78 (1984).
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It should be noted, however, that such a resolution of the independent
authorization problem is contrary to the prior analysis of that same problem with articles 8 and 9.214 Article 10(a) sets forth that the "Convention
shall not interfere with the freedom" to effectuate mail service while article
8 and 9 provide that the "State(s) shall be free" to utilize the service methods provided therein. From the perspective of statutory construction, articles 8 and 9 appear to vest power in the governments of the contracting
nations to decide whether to use the service method permitted by the Convention. Article 10(a), on the other hand, generally extends to everyone
(individuals) the right to use mail service; a right which the signatory nations should not be able to deny their citizens.
To differentiate these two provisions solely on the basis of somewhat
contrived linguistic distinctions is unsound, however; the intent of the drafters must also be considered by analyzing the underlying policies of the Convention. a 5 The service methods provided for in article 10 were a direct
response to the need for foreign recognition of liberal service methods.2" 6
To safeguard the sovereignty of the contracting parties, however, nations
were specifically allowed to object to their usage within their territory.
When American courts reject the need for an independent legal basis
outside the Convention, they are surely furthering the fundamental goal of
the Convention by perfecting a unitary approach to international judicial
assistance. Many foreign courts, however, will almost certainly reject this
approach because their internal law has long required service via official
channels. 17 To allow their nationals the use of all the informal service
methods of article 10 would affront their sovereign judicial systems. The
likely outcome of this problem, therefore, will be separate and conflicting
interpretations of article 10 by the common and civil law countries.
Although this result is somewhat unsettling, American courts should continue to interpret article 10 in this way because the liberal effects only serve
to benefit American litigants.
The policy considerations with articles 8 and 9 are less compelling, however. Although the courts would probably have the power to mandate that
foreign consuls assist in the service of process, there would be no advantage
to doing so when so many other liberal methods of service are available to
American litigants.

214. See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text.

215. See, e.g., Ormandy v. Lynn, 122 Misc. 2d 954, -, 472 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275 (1984) (court
must examine intent of Convention when language is ambiguous).
216. See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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3. Articles 11, 19, 24-25: Other Methods Permitted by International
Agreement and Foreign Internal Law
The third and final category of service methods permitted consists of
those which are independently authorized outside the Convention. 2 ' Article 11 permits signatory nations to devise new methods of service for use
among themselves as evidenced by separate bilateral or multilateral agreements.2 2 3 Articles 24 and 25 similarly uphold the validity of any other special or supplementary agreements which govern these matters.2 2z
Article 19, however, has created thorny problems for courts and legal
commentators alike. It states that the Convention shall not affect the internal law of a signatory nation insofar as it permits other methods of serving
process from abroad within its territory. 22 5 Article 19 was specifically inserted into the Convention at the request of the American delegation to
preserve Public Law 88-619226 which had basically authorized the transmission of foreign letters rogatory.2 2 7 The effects of article 19 have been
farther reaching, however, for it has been interpreted as authorizing the use
of any service method which is "permitted" by the internal law of the receiving nation.
Although article 19 has been misconstrued in various ways, 22 8 the most
prevalent confusion centers around the proof of foreign law needed to
demonstrate that a service method is "permitted" by the receiving nation.
Thus far the courts have offered little guidance to this problem's resolu222. The methods of service provided for by the first two categories, to the contrary, are
authorized by the Convention itself.
223. See PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 40; Amram, supra note 40, at 653.
224. See PermanentBureau Report, supra note 62, at 328.

225. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 19.
226. Amram, supra note 40, at 653-54.
227. See supra notes 37-40 and accompaaying text. It is debatable whether article 19 actually

preserves Pub. L. 88-619 as it relates to letters rogatory. By its terms, article 19 recognizes the use
of alternative service methods "other than those provided for in the proceding articles" of the
Convention. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 19. This manner of service already appears to be
regulated by either article 10(b) or article 9. See Kadota v. Hosogai, 125 Ariz. 131, -, 608 P.2d
68, 73 (Ct. App. 1980). See also Downs, supra note 34, at 131.

228. Some writers have been led to believe that due to article 19, Federal Rule 4(i) is not
preempted. See, e.g., Note, supra note 76, at 152-53. The basic source of this misconception
appears to be a number of politicized statements in the Senate Executive Report made to drum up
support for ratification of the Convention. See REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON THE CONVENTION ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (Apr. 12, 1967) ("this

convention does not invade the domain of state law in the United States"). The broad assertion
that the internal law of the United States would not be changed in any which way by the Convention, see id. at 6; PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 28; Amram, supra note 52, at 90,
cannot possibly be taken literally.
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tion.2 2 9 It has been suggested that the word "permits" in article 19 should
be read to mean "does not prohibit."'2 3 This would be a poor standard,
however. State service of process statutes, for example, which omit mail
service provisions certainly do not "permit" such service.2 31 But under the
proposed test such a statute could possibly be interpreted as "not prohibiting" mail service because of a lack of any specific provision denying its

use.2 32 In light of the original purpose of article 19, courts should narrowly
construe it and only allow the use of alternative service methods which foreign law specifically authorizes.2 33 Courts should not risk infringing upon
the sovereignty of foreign judicial systems when the Convention otherwise
provides a variety of liberal service methods.2 34
C.

"Due Process" Guarantees

For service of process to be upheld as valid in American courts it must

comply not only with the provisions of the Convention, but also with constitutional due process requirements. 2 35 The standard used to determine
whether due process is violated was set out in Mullane v. CentralHanover
Bank & Trust Co. ,236 where the United States Supreme Court stated:
[A] fundamental requirement of due process.., is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties
of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections. ... The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on the
ground that ... the form chosen is not substantially less likely to
229. See DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 1981) (any state
or federal service method may be used "as long as the nation receiving service has not objected to
them"); Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 456, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (use of 4(i)
methods permissible if not objected to "or otherwise").
230. See Siegel, Supplementary Practice Commentary C4-34, 74, 28 U.S.C.A. FED. R. Civ.
P. 4 (West Supp. 1986). [hereinafter Siegel].
231. Cf. Sacotte v. Ideal-Werk Krug & Priester, 121 Wis. 2d 401, 406, 359 N.W.2d 393, 395
(1984) (service by mail on foreign corporations under Wis. STAT. § 801.11(5) (1983-84) specifically excluded as a means of "personal service").
232. Cf. Siegel, supra note 230, at 74 ("one should not have to show that the [service] method
has a precise counterpart ... in the foreign nation's internal law").
233. See generally Downs, supra note 34, at 132; Note Rev. Litig., supra note 92, at 519-20
(discussing proof of foreign law).
234. The service methods available under Rule 4(i), see supra note 26, are generally permitted
by the Convention: Service in a manner "prescribed" by foreign law [4(i)(1)(A)] is permitted
under art. 19; service by letter rogatory [4(i)(1)(B)] under art. 10(b) and (c) (if made by at least a
"competent person"); mail service [4(i)(1)(D)] under art. 10(a) (but probably need not require a
signed receipt nor must it be dispatched by the clerk of court); and service as directed by order of
the court [4(i)(1)(E)] only when in compliance with the Convention's provisions.
235. E.g., Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d at 830, 838 (2d Cir. 1986).
236. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary
substitutes. z3 7
At least one method of service commonly employed in various foreign
countries often failed to give defendants adequate notice. 238 The Hague
Convention was actually created in part to deal with the injustices inherent
in such a situation.2 39 The drafters aimed at accomplishing this by inserting
provisions which fairly regulate the granting of and relief from default judgments. It appears that the Mullane due process considerations were incorporated into these provisions of the Convention. z4
1. Article 15: Default Judgments
Article 15 provides that a judgment "shall" not be given unless the document is shown to have been served in sufficient time to permit the defendant to appear and defend. Specifically, a document must have been (a)
served according to the "internal law" of the receiving nation, or (b) "actually delivered to the defendant or to his residence" according to a method
permitted by the Convention.2 4 1 Signatory nations are permitted to additionally declare, however, that under certain prescribed circumstances,
judgments may be given without proof of service.2 42
The article 15 default provisions are mandatory and preempt conflicting
state and federal statutes.24 3 By ensuring that a judgment is stayed until
adequate notice is received, they effectively protect defendants against any
constitutionally deficient service methods. 2' The second half of article 15
(the "permissible declaration" provision), however, could theoretically
pose a problem. It allows judgments to be entered only after "every reason-

237. Id. at 314-15.
238. In the system of service referred to as "notification au parquet," a party merely delivers
a document to a local judicial official who thereafter "attempts" to forward it to the foreign defendant. Failure to notify him will not invalidate service, however. See Amram, supra note 52, at
90-91.
239. See DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 1981); Amram,
The Revolutionary Change in Service of ProcessAbroad in French Civil Procedure,2 INT'L LAW
650, 652 (1967).
240. See Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 431 F. Supp. 1226, 1229 (N.D. Ill.), aft'd,
565 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,435 U.S. 905 (1978); Shoei Kako v. Superior Court, 33
Cal. App. 3d 808, 820, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402, 410 (1973) ("[a]rticle 15 of the Convention is the
equivalent of our national due process concept").
241. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 15.
242. Id.
243. Default judgments in federal courts are governed by FED. R. Civ. P. 55.
244. The injustices of service "au parquet," see supra note 238, and of the service of stale

documents, see supra note 148, should therefore be completely corrected by the "due process"
provisions of article 15.
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able effort has been made" to obtain proof of service.24 5 Because the Central Authority must always issue proof of service or an explanation of why
the document could not be delivered,2 4 6 it appears that plaintiffs cannot say
they have made "every reasonable effort" unless they have utilized the Central Authority. A court should only grant a default judgment under the
second half of article 15, therefore, when a Central Authority has refused to
respond to the plaintiff as mandated by article 6.247
2.

Article 16: Relief from Default Judgments

Article 16 is undoubtedly the most ambiguously drafted provision in the
Convention. It permits courts to "relieve [a] defendant from the effects of
the expiration of the time for appeal from [a] judgment" when certain prerequisites are met.248 Although this has been commonly thought of as providing courts with the power to vacate judgments, 24 9 the actual language
indicates that article 16 merely allows extra time for appeal. 25 ° Although
persuasive arguments can be advanced to support either interpretation, constitutional due process considerations favor that article 16 be literally construed to only provide for a time extension. A comprehensive analysis of all
the provisions of article 16 leads to that conclusion.
In a United States federal court, article 16 would have to be interpeted
concurrently with Federal Rule 60 which governs relief from judgment.2 5 I
Rule 60(b) sets forth six grounds on which a court may set aside a judgment. One of those grounds is where the judgment is void.252 A void judgment will arise when the court does not have jurisdiction over the party,
which will always occur when service of process is constitutionally deficient.2 53 When a judgment is void, furthermore, there can be no time limit
within which it may be attacked.25 4

245. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 15.
246. Id. at art. 6.
247. See Note Rev. Litig., supra note 92, at 516-17. In Rivers v. Stihi Inc., 434 So. 2d 766,
770 (Ala. 1983), the court noted that it would treat a defendant as having been served if the
receiving nation's Central Authority refused to serve process. This would appear to be appropriate under article 15.
248. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 16.
249. See Amram, supra note 40, at 653; Bishop, supra note 1, at 1043.
250. See PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 41.
251. FED. R. Civ. P. 60. Cf.infra note 265 and accompanying text.
252. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(B)(4).
253. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2682, 2862
(1984).
254. E.g., Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. v. Porter, 95 F.R.D. 417, 419 (N.D. Ind. 1982).
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If article 16 is interpreted as granting the courts power to vacate a judgment, by its subsequent terms, relief can not be granted until the defendant
discloses "a prima facie defense."2 5 Such a prerequisite would clearly be
unconstitutional, however, when a judgment is void due to defective service
of process.25 6 Unless American courts are willing to uphold this provision
in all cases outside of void judgments, article 16 should not be viewed as a
procedure for the opening of default judgments.
Construing article 16 as a time extension for appeals, on the other hand,
runs into fewer difficulties. The third paragraph of article 16 permits signatory nations to declare that an appeal will not be entertained if a stipulated
amount of time has passed since the date of the judgment.25 7 The United
States has adopted this provision and has accordingly set as its time limit
the expiration of one year, or the period within which the appeal may be
taken "under the procedural regulations of the court in which the judgment
has been entered," whichever is later.25 8
If a defendant appeals a judgment which is not void (that is service was
constitutionally sufficient), and one year has passed, then under paragraph
three of article 16, the appeal would not be taken. At this point, paragraph
1 may be construed in one of two ways. Either its application has been
voided by the preemption of paragraph 3, or the courts in liberal fashion
could nevertheless entertain an appeal under its provisions so long as a
prima facie defense is disclosed. The latter interpretation should be
favored.259
If a defendant appeals a void judgment on the other hand, and one year
has passed, then under paragraph three the "procedural regulations of the
court" would reflect that there is no time limit for appeal. Paragraph one of
article 16 would accordingly never kick in because there has been no "expiration of the time for appeal."
Thus far only one court has directly interpreted the provisions of articles 15 and 16. In Gould EntertainmentCorp. v. Bodo,2 6 ° a foreign defendant requested the court to vacate a judgment granted under article 15(b).2 61
The plaintiff had effected service of process through the Italian Central Au255. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 16.
256. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 253, § 2862, at 197 (a court cannot exercise
discretion when granting relief to a void judgment).
257. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 16.
258. Id. at United States declaration.
259. See Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929) (treaties are to be liberally construed to
enlarge the rights granted). For a contrary analysis of article 16, see Bishop, supra note 1, at
1041-43.
260. 107 F.R.D. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
261. Id. at 310:

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:649

thority by delivering a summons to the defendant's residence.26 2 The court
determined that such service was "reasonably calculated to give actual notice" and did not grant relief because the motion to vacate was not filed
"within a reasonable time" as stipulated by article 16 and Federal Rule
263

60(b).

The court in Gould demanded that the defendant disclose a primafacie
defense even though the time for appeal had not yet lapsed. 2 4 In so doing,
it implicitly interpreted paragraph one of article 16 as granting the power to
vacate judgments as opposed to allowing extra time for appeal. The decision is also instructive in two other important respects. First, it shows that
article 16 does not preempt Rule 60, but rather the two must be read together. This appears reasonable even under the Ackermann approach because article 16 does not provide "dispositive" rules regarding the bases for
relief from judgment.2 65 Second, the decision demonstrates the importance
of initially establishing that the service method used had comported with
due process. If delivery of the summons to the defendant's residence had
been deemed constitutionally deficient, the underlying judgment would
have been void and the analysis of article 16 undoubtedly different. Courts
in the future should avoid making a Gould analysis by literally construing
article 16 to only regulate the timing for appeals.
D. Administrative and Other Provisions
To facilitate the transmission of documents through the Central Authorities, the Convention limits the costs borne by an applicant to those
arising from the use of an official process server or a particular method of
service.26 6 The Convention also directs nations to use diplomatic channels
to resolve any conflicts which may arise under its provisions.2 67

262. Id. at 309.
263. Id. at 310.
264. Id. at 310-11.
265. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. The issue as to whether Federal Rule 60
should also be used in state court proceedings when interpreting article 16 is more difficult to
resolve. Although state rules regarding service procedures are displaced by federal law under the
Ackermann approach, a court making a "Reverse-Erie" analysis may find the state regulation of
default judgment procedures to be a "substantive" area of considerably greater interest. See K.
CLERMONT, supra note 97, at 233. See also supra note 103.
266. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 12. The fees charged by the signatory nations vary
according to the circumstances. See PermanentBureau Report, supra note 62, at 324; PRACTICAL
HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 35. The United States maintains a system of reciprocity, charging a

foreign applicant only when his nation of origin similarly imposes a fee. See JusticeDep't Memorandum, supra note 11, at 7.
267. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 14.
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The transmission of both judicial and extrajudicial documents is regulated by the Convention.2 68 Article 17, however, specifically provides that
extrajudicial documents "may" be served by any method that the treaty
permits.26 9 It is unclear, therefore, just how the Convention mandatorily
applies to the service of extrajudicial documents.2 70
The Convention contains a number of other general provisions which
ensure its proper functioning. Significantly, they allow for the establishment of more than one Central Authority2 7 1 as well as for agreements to
dispense with various technical requirements.27 2 Furthermore, each ratifying country must notify the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs of all
declarations and pertinent information.2 7 3 With one exception, the Convention replaces the service sections of the 1905 and 1954 Hague Conventions on Civil Procedure.2 74 Nonmembers of the Hague Conference may
accede to the Convention provided no member nation objects 275 and a signatory country is permitted to extend the Convention to its territories.2 76
Finally, the Convention automatically renews itself every five years unless a
party denounces it. In that event, the Convention will still remain in force
for the other signatory nations.2 77
E.

Problem Areas

1. Time Limit for Service
The Hague Convention does not specify any time period within which
service of process must be executed.2 78 State and federal rules, on the other
hand, place express time limitations on their service procedures which, if
not met, may result in the dismissal or complete bar of the cause of action. 279 Because external law must fill this "gap" in the Convention, 280 a
268. Id. at art. 1. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
269. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 17,
270. See generally PRACTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 43; Amram, supra note 40, at
653.
271. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 18. See Felice Feder .Oriental Art, Inc. v. Scanlon, No.
81 Civ. 5168 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1983).
272. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 20.
273. Id. at art. 21.
274. Id. at arts. 22, 23.
275. Id. at art. 28.

276. Id. at art. 29.
277. Id. at art. 30.

278. Justice Dep't Memorandum, supra note 11, at 16.
279. In the state of Wisconsin, for example, an action is commenced by the filing of a summons and complaint provided that service of process is properly made within 60 days after the
filing. Wis. STAT. § 801.02(1) (1985-86). If service is not made within this time period, a court
may dismiss the action. Wis. STAT. § 805.03 (1985-86). Furthermore, failure to effectuate ser-

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:649

problem is created. Federal and state time limitations, although adequate
for the service procedures they regulate, are superimposed on the Convention and possibly constrain its service mechanisms.
The courts which have thus far addressed this problem appear only to
have exacerbated it. In Brown v. Bellaplast Maschinenbau,8z 1 the court
ruled on the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to comply with Federal Rule 4(j)'s time limit for service. 28 2 Although correctly recognizing
that service made under Rule 4(i) is not subject to the 120-day time limitation of Rule 4(j), the court's further analysis of the interplay between these•
rules and the Hague Convention is cause for concern.2 8 3 The court reasoned that because the Convention is not incorporated into Rule 4(i), but
rather supersedes and preempts it, service made under the Covention would
have to comply with the more restrictive time limitation of Rule 4(j). 8 4 An
almost identical analysis was made by the court in Foster v. Dentaurum,
Inc.285 when determining the applicability of Rule 4(j)'s time limitations to
service made under the Convention. 286 The court noted that because "the
provisions of [Rule 4(i)] apply only to service in a foreign country not covered by the Hague Convention," Rule 4(j) must be applicable.28 7
The decisions reached in Brown and Foster demonstrate a poor understanding of the underlying policies of both Rule 40) and the Convention.
Service under Rule 4(i) was excepted from the 120-day time limitation of
Rule 4(j) in recognition of the additional difficulties that are often faced
with service in foreign countries. 8 8 Outside of possibly service via the Cen-

vice within the 60 day period means the action was never commenced and hence the statute of
limitations was not tolled. WIS. STAT. § 801.02(1) (1985-86). As a result, a plaintiffs cause of
action could effectively be barred. See J. CONWAY, WISCONSIN AND FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE § 22.03 (2d ed. 1976).
280. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
281. No. 84-1865 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 1986).
282. Id. According to Rule 4(j), an action will be dismissed if the plaintiff has neither served
process on the defendant within 120 days after filing nor has shown good cause why such service
has not been made. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(j). Rule 4(j)'s provisions do not apply, however, if service is
being made in a foreign country by a method provided in Rule 4(i). Id. Service under rule 4(i)
has no express time limitation. Id.
283. Brown, No. 84-1865.
284. Id.
285. No. 85-4432 (D. Kan. Sept. 17, 1986).
286. Id.
287. Id. In Newport Components v. NEC Home Elecs., 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1542-43 (C.D.
Cal. 1987), a federal district court also applied the 120-day period provided by Rule 4(j), but it did
so without any discussion of its relevance to the Convention's procedures.
288. Siegel, supra note 230, at 66.
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tral Authority, 289 all of the other alternative methods permitted by the Convention are not any more expeditious than those methods provided in Rule
4(i). As a matter of fact, most of the Rule 4(i) service methods were incorporated into the Convention.2 9 Both Brown and Foster, therefore, should
have reached the opposite conclusion. The Convention, like Rule 4(i),
should not be regulated by a 120-day Rule 4(j) time limitation.

In light of the Ackermann decision, a more critical and potentially explosive issue is whether federal time limitations for service should be enforced in state court proceedings when a service method under the
Convention is used.2 91 Contrary to general statutes of limitation, which are
clearly a "substantive" matter left to regulation by the states,2 92 time limitations for service are bound up with notice-giving and can be viewed as procedural. 293 Regardless of how they are considered, however, courts in
deciding this issue should ultimately balance the interests of the state
against those of the nation.2 94 If service methods under the Convention
cannot fairly be carried out within the time limitations imposed by state
regulations, 295 the national interest in maintaining an effective multilateral
treaty should dictate that uniform federal rules be enforced in state courts.

2. Waiver of Insufficiency of Service
Service of process contrary to Hague Convention rules is generally deficient regardless of whether the defendant has received actual notice of the
289. The Central Authorities are also not placed under any time constraints with the execution of service requests. It is generally agreed, however, "that service should be made [or attempted] within a 'reasonable time', the views on what is reasonable ranging from two weeks to
two months." U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 56, at 317. See Justice Dep't Memorandum,
supra note 11, at 16-17 ("[e]xperience teaches that the processing of foreign service requests varies
considerably from country to country").
290. See supra note 234. Furthermore, according to the provisions of article 19, any method
of service under Rule 4(i) which is "permitted" by the internal law of a foreign signatory is valid.
See supra notes 225-34 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
292. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
293. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (rules regulating service of process are
procedural).
294. Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1986).
295. State statutes which limit a plaintiff's service efforts to 60 days, see supra note 279, are
arguably too short to effectuate service under the Convention. Cf. Justice Dep't Memorandum,
supra note 11, at 17 (suggesting that American plaintiffsfirst make a follow-up inquiry with Central Authorities when no response is received after a 45-60 day period).
State courts do generally allow a time extension if a "good faith" effort to serve the defendant
has been made, thereby mitigating the constrictive effects of a statute with a shorter time limitation. See, eg., Brown v. Bellaplast Maschinenbau, 104 F.R.D. 585, 588 (E.D. Pa. 1985). In light
of the inherent difficulties with serving abroad, however, plaintiffs should not have to make such a
showing until a much longer period of time has passed.
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proceedings.296 "Legal notice" is rendered only by complying with the
Convention's terms. 2 97 In Hartley v. Wheatherford Crane Co. ,298 for example, the plaintiff attempted to serve the defendant by mail, even though this
form of service was objected to by the receiving nation. 299 Although the
defendant had initially accepted service of process, the court found the service invalid, noting that "the Hague Convention rules cannot be waived by
a signature on a registered mail receipt." 3" The form of service chosen,
although calculated to give adequate notice in line with constitutional due
process requirements, must comport with the Convention." 1
The courts have uniformly held, however, that a defendant waives his or
her right to object to deficient service under the Convention if it is not exercised at the appropriate time.30 2 State and federal rules generally require
that objections to service of process be raised in the defendant's answer or
first pre-answer motion.30 3 Although such a statutory waiver policy may
detrimentally affect the rights afforded by the Convention, 3 4 the countervailing state and federal interests in maintaining an effective and efficient
judicial system seem to be disproportionately greater.30 5
296. See, e.g., Dr. Ing. H.C.F. Porsche A. G. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 755, 762,
117 Cal. Rptr. 155, 159 (1981); but cf.A.I.M. Int'l, Inc. v. Battenfeld Extrusions Sys., 116 F.R.D.
633, 638-39 (M.D. Ga. 1987).
297. See Kadota v. Hosagai, 125 Ariz. 131, -, 608 P.2d 68, 74 (Ct. App. 1980) (distinguishing between legal notice and knowledge of a proceeding); Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33
Cal. App. 3d 808, 818, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402, 409 (1973) (actual notice distinguished from notice
adequate under an international treaty).
298. No. 86-0758 (E.D. Pa. filed Sept. 24, 1986).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. See Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 838 (2d Cir. 1986) (service of process must
satisfy both constitutional due process and Convention).
302. See Photolab Corp. v. Simplex Specialty Co., 806 F.2d 807, 811 (8th Cir. 1986); Zisman
v. Sieger, 106 F.R.D. 194, 197-98 (1985); State ex rel. Buffington v. Gaertner, 657 S.W.2d 957, 958
(Mo. 1983).
303. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(g) and (h). It should be noted that under Rule 12(g), objections
to service of process must be made in the first motion only if they are "then available" to the
defendant. See Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 434 So. 2d 766, 769-70 (Ala. 1983) ("defendant could not be
expected to anticipate defenses to attempts at service not yet made").
304. The Convention endeavors to safeguard not only the due process rights of litigants but
also the territorial and judicial sovereignty of nations.
305. See Zisman, 106 F.R.D. at 198 (waiver rule was "intended to eliminate unnecessary
delays at the pleading stage").
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CONCLUSION

The already significant amount of transnational litigation is bound to
multiply as international trade and business operations expand.30 6 As a result, courts and attorneys alike will increasingly be called upon to interpret
the provisions of the Hague Convention. An accurate interpretation of the
Convention, however, is more than an analysis of the plain language of the
text. It requires a fundamental understanding of the policies and objectives
being furthered by the Convention's usage.
As a multilateral agreement, the signatory parties to the Convention
have guaranteed their recognition of a number of methods of serving process. Although liberal in its scope and methodology for bringing notice to
foreign litigants, the Convention goes equally as far in safeguarding "due
process" rights and national sovereignty. Above all, the Convention seeks
to establish a uniform system of international judicial assistance.
To further these goals, American courts must first recognize the Convention as the supreme law of the land, preemptive of all conflicting state
and federal regulations.30 7 Where there are gaps in the Convention, state
and federal courts alike should, wherever possible, apply federal law to preserve uniformity. 308 Because of the great national interest in regulating international service procedures, some state autonomy must be sacrificed.
In recognition of the importance and frequent usage of the Hague Convention, state and federal service procedures should also be specifically
amended. The statutory additions will not actually be authorizing the Convention's use; the provisions of a supreme treaty must automatically be followed. 30 9 The objective is to generally put the legal community on notice of
the Convention's potential applicability. Federal Rule 4(e), for example,
could be amended to include the following: "Whenever the provisions of
any applicable treaty or convention so direct, service shall be made in conformity therewith."3 ° State and federal statutes governing the time limit

306. In 1979 the United States Central Authority alone was processing some 1500 foreign
requests a year. JusticeDep't Memorandum, supra note 11, at 4. By 1986 that figure had already
jumped to approximately 5000 per year. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 14, 1987, at _, col. 1.
307. See supra notes 81, 92 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
309. See Siegel, supra note 230, at 76.
310. Some commentators have called for an amendment to rule 4(i). See Bishop, supra note
1, at 1053; Okla. Note, supra note 92, at 299-300. Because Rule 4(i) is only supplementary in
nature, an addition to its provisions would merely permit service "pursuant to any applicable
treaty or convention." This would leave the impression that the other service methods under
Rules 4(i) and 4(e) are equally permissible when they in fact may not be. See Siegel, supra note
230, at 76. For this reason, an amendment should be made to Rule 4(e).
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for service should likewise be amended.31 Federal Rule 4(j) should read:
"This subdivision shall not apply to service in a foreign country pursuant to
subdivision (i) of this rule or any applicable treaty or convention." Finally,
statutes governing default judgments should be changed to reflect the potential application of Convention procedures.3 12 By keeping everyone appraised of their rights and duties under the Convention, the American as
well as the international judicial system will function more efficiently.
GARY A. MAGNARINI

311. See supra notes 278-95 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 241-65 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX A

CONVENTION ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND
EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL
MATTERS
The States signatory to the present Convention,
Desiring to create appropriate means to ensure that judicial and extrajudicial documents to be served abroad shall be brought to the notice of the
addressee in sufficient time,
Desiring to improve the organization of mutual judicial assistance for
that purpose by simplifying and expediting the procedure,
Have resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect and have agreed
upon the following provisions:
Article 1
The present Convention shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial
matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad.
This Convention shall not apply where the address of the person to be
served with the document is not known.
CHAPTER 1 -

JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS
Article 2

Each contracting State shall designate a Central Authority which will
undertake to receive requests for service coming from other contracting
States and to proceed in conformity with the provisions of articles 3 to 6.
Each State shall organize the Central Authority in conformity with its
own law.
Article 3
The authority or judicial officer competent under the law of the State in
which the documents originate shall forward to the Central Authority of
the State addressed a request conforming to the model annexed to the present Convention, without any requirement of legislation or other equivalent
formality.
The document to be served or a copy thereof shall be annexed to the
request. The request and the document shall both be furnished in
duplicate.
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Article 4
If the Central Authority considers that the request does not comply
with the provisions of the present Convention it shall promptly inform the
applicant and specify its objections to the request.
Article 5
The Central Authority of the State addressed shall itself serve the document or shall arrange to have it served by an appropriate agency, either (a) by a method prescribed by its internal law for the service of documents in domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory, or
(b) by a particular method requested by the applicant, unless such a
method is incompatible with the law of the State addressed.
Subject to sub-paragraph (b) of the first paragraph of this article, the
document may always be served by delivery to an addressee who accepts it
voluntarily.
If the document is to be served under the first paragraph above, the
Central Authority may require the document to be written in, or translated
into, the official language or one of the official languages of the State
addressed.
That part of the request, in the form attached to the present Convention, which contains a summary of the document to be served, shall be
served with the document.
Article 6
The Central Authority of the State addressed or any authority which it
may have designated for that purpose, shall complete a certificate in the
form of the model annexed to the present Convention.
The certificate shall state that the document has been served and shall
include the method, the place and the date of service and the person to
whom the document was delivered. If the document has not been served,
the certificate shall set out the reasons which have prevented service.
The applicant may require that a certificate not completed by a Central
Authority or by a judicial authority shall be countersigned by one of these
authorities.
The certificate shall be forwarded directly to the applicant.
Article 7
The standard terms in the model annexed to the present Convention
shall in all cases be written either in French or in English. They may also
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be written in the official language, or in one of the official languages, of the
State in which the documents originate.
The corresponding blanks shall be completed either in the language of
the State addressed or in French or in English.
Article 8
Each contracting State shall be free to effect service of judicial documents upon persons abroad, without application of any compulsion, directly through its diplomatic or consular agents.
Any State may declare that it is opposed to such service within its territory, unless the document is to be served upon a national of the State in
which the documents originate.
Article 9
Each contracting State shall be free, in addition, to use consular channels to forward documents, for the purpose of service, to those authorities
of another contracting State which are designated by the latter for this
purpose.
Each contracting State may, if exceptional circumstances so require, use
diplomatic channels for the same purpose.
Article 10
Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with(a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly
to persons abroad,
(b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent persons
of the State of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through
the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of
destination,
(c) the freedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination.
Article 11
The present Convention shall not prevent two or more contracting
States from agreeing to permit, for the purpose of service of judicial documents, channels of transmission other than those provided for in the preceding articles and, in particular, direct communication between their
respective authorities.
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Article 12
The service of judicial documents coming from a contracting State shall
not give rise to any payment or reimbursement of taxes or costs for the
services rendered by the State addressed.
The applicant shall pay or reimburse the costs occasioned by(a) the employment of a judicial officer or of a person competent under
the law of the State of destination,
(b) the use of a particular method of service.
Article 13
Where a request for service complies with the terms of the present Convention, the State addressed may refuse to comply therewith only if it
deems that compliance would infringe its sovereignty or security.
It may not refuse to comply solely on the ground that, under its internal
law, it claims exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action or
that its internal law would not permit the action upon which the application
is based.
The Central Authority shall, in case of refusal, promptly inform the
applicant and state the reasons for the refusal.
Article 14
Difficulties which may arise in connection with the transmission of judicial documents for service shall be settled through diplomatic channels.
Article 15
Where a writ of summons or an equivalent document had to be transmitted abroad for the purpose of service, under the provisions of the present
Convention, and the defendant has not appeared, judgment shall not be
given until it is established that(a) the document was served by a method prescribed by the internal law
of the State addressed for the service of documents in domestic actions
upon persons who are within its territory, or
(b) the document was actually delivered to the defendant or to his residence by another method provided for by this Convention,
and that in either of these cases the service or the delivery was effected
in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend.
Each contracting State shall be free to declare that the judge, notwithstanding the provisions of the first paragraph of this article, may give judg-

1988]

SER VICE OF PROCESS ABROAD

ment even if no certificate of service or delivery has been received, if all the
following conditions are fulfilled(a) the document was transmitted by one of the methods provided for
in this Convention,
(b) a period of time of not less than six months, considered adequate by
the judge in the particular case, has elapsed since the date of the transmission of the document,
(c) no certificate of any kind has been received, even though every reasonable effort has been made to obtain it through the competent authorities
of the State addressed.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraphs the judge
may order, in case of urgency, any provisional or protective measures.
Article 16
When a writ of summons or an equivalent document had to be transmitted abroad for the purpose of service, under the provisions of the present
Convention, -and a judgment has been entered against a defendant who has
not appeared, the judge shall have the power to relieve the defendant from
the effects of the expiration of the time for appeal from the judgment if the
following conditions are fulfilled(a) the defendant, without any fault on his part, did not have knowledge of the document in sufficient time to defend, or knowledge of the judgment in sufficient time to appeal, and
(b) the defendant has disclosed a prima facie defense to the action on
the merits.
An application for relief may be filed only within a reasonable time after
the defendant has knowledge of the judgment.
Each contracting State may declare that the application will not be entertained if it is filed after the expiration of a time to be stated in the declaration, but which shall in no case be less than one year following the date of
the judgment.
This article shall not apply to judgments concerning status or capacity
of persons.
CHAPTER II -

EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS
Article 17

Extrajudicial documents emanating from authorities and judicial officers of a contracting State may be transmitted for the purpose of service in
another contracting State by the methods and under the provisions of the
present Convention.
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GENERAL CLAUSES

Article 18
Each contracting State may designate other authorities in addition to
the Central Authority and shall determine the extent of their competence.
The applicant shall, however, in all cases, have the right to address a
request directly to the Central Authority.
Federal States shall be free to designate more than one Central
Authority.
Article 19
To the extent that the internal law of a contracting State permits methods of transmission, other than those provided for in the preceding articles,
of documents coming from abroad, for service within its territory, the present Convention shall not affect such provisions.
Article 20
The present Convention shall not prevent an agreement between any
two or more contracting States to dispense with(a) the necessity for duplicate copies of transmitted documents as required by the second paragraph of article 3,
(b) the language requirements of the third paragraph of article 5 and
article 7,
(c) the provision of the fourth paragraph of article 5,
(d) the provisions of the second paragraph of article 12.
Article 21
Each contracting State shall, at the time of the deposit of its instrument
of ratification or accession, or at a later date, inform the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Netherlands of the following(a) the designation of authorities, pursuant to articles 2 and 18,
(b) the designation of the authority competent to complete the certificate pursuant to article 6,
(c) the designation of the authority competent to receive documents
transmitted by consular channels, pursuant to article 9.
Each contracting State shall similarly inform the Ministry, where appropriate, of(a) opposition to the use of methods of transmission pursuant to articles
8 and 10,
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(b) declarations pursuant to the second paragraph of article 15 and the
third paragraph of article 16,
(c) all modifications of the above designations, oppositions and
declarations.
Article 22
Where Parties to the present Convention are also Parties to one or both
of the Conventions on civil procedure signed at The Hague on 17th July
1905, and on 1st March 1954, this Convention shall replace as between
them articles 1 to 7 of the earlier Conventions (footnotes omitted).
Article 23
The present Convention shall not affect the application of article 23 of
the Convention on civil procedure signed at The Hague on 17th July 1905,
or of article 24 of the Convention on civil procedure signed at The Hague
on 1st March 1954.
These articles shall, however, apply only if methods of communication,
identical to those provided for in these Conventions, are used.
Article 24
Supplementary agreements between Parties to the Conventions of 1905
and 1954 shall be considered as equally applicable to the present Convention, unless the Parties have otherwise agreed.
Article 25
Without prejudice to the provisions of articles 22 and 24, the present
Convention shall not derogate from Conventions containing provisions on
the matters governed by this Convention to which the contracting States
are, or shall become, Parties.
Article 26
The present Convention shall be open for signature by the States represented at the Tenth Session of the Hague Convention on Private International Law.
It shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
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Article 27
The present Convention shall enter into force on the sixtieth day after
deposit of the third instrument of ratification referred to in the second paragraph of article 26.
The convention shall enter into force for each signatory state which ratifies subsequently on the sixtieth day after the deposit of its instrument of
ratification.
Article 28
Any State not represented at the Tenth Session of the Hague Conference
on Private International Law may accede to the present Convention after it
has entered into force in accordance with the first paragraph of article 27.
The instrument of accession shall be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Netherlands.
The Convention shall enter into force for such a State in the absence of
any objection from a State, which has ratified the Convention before such
deposit, notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
within a period of six months after the date on which the said Ministry has
notified it of such accession.
In the absence of any such objection, the Convention shall enter into
force for the acceding State on the first day of the month following the
expiration of the last of the periods referred to in the preceding paragraph.
Article 29
Any State may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that the present Convention shall extend to all the territories for the
international relations of which it is responsible, or to one or more of them.
Such a declaration shall take effect on the date of entry into force of the
Convention for the State concerned.
At any time thereafter, such extensions shall be notified to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
The Convention shall enter into force for the territories mentioned in
such an extension on the sixtieth day after the notification referred to in the
preceding paragraph.
Article 30
The present Convention shall remain in force for five years from the
date of its entry into force in accordance with the first paragraph of article
27, even for States which have ratified it or acceded to it subsequently.
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If there has been no denunciation, it shall be renewed tacitly every five
years.
Any denunciation shall be notified to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Netherlands at least six months before the end of the five year period.
It may be limited to certain of the territories to which the Convention
applies.
The denunciation shall have effect only as regards the State which has
notified it. The Convention shall remain in force for the other contracting
States.
Article 31
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands shall give notice to
the States referred to in article 26, and to the States which have acceded in
accordance with article 28, of the following(a) the signatures and ratifications referred to in article 26;
(b) the date on which the present Convention enters into force in accordance with the first paragraph of article 27;
(c) the accessions referred to in article 28 and the dates on which they
take effect;
(d) the extensions referred to in article 29 and the dates on which they
take effect;
(e) the designations, oppositions and declarations referred to in article
21;
(f) the denunciations referred to in the third paragraph of article 30.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized
thereto have signed the present Convention.
DONE at The Hague, on the 15th day of November, 1965, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic, in a single
copy which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the
Netherlands, and of which a certified copy shall be sent, through the diplomatic channel, to each of the States represented at the Tenth Session of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law.

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague November 15,
1965; entered into force for the United States February 10, 1969. 20 U.S.T.
361; T.I.A.S. 6638; 658 U.N.T.S. 163. States which are parties:
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Antigua and Barbuda
Barbados
Belgium
Botswana
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Egypt
Fiji
Finland
France
Federal Republic of Germany
Greece
Israel
Italy
Japan

Kurubati
Luxembourg
Malawi
Netherlands
Nevis
Norway
Portugal
Seychelles
Spain
St. Kitts
St. Lucia
St. Vincent
Sweden
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
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